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Preface
Many colleges and universities are offering courses in quantitative reasoning
for all students. One model for a quantitative reasoning course is to provide
students with a single cohesive topic. Ideally, such a topic can pique the curiosity of students with wide ranging academic interests and limited mathematical
background. This text is intended for use in such a course. Game theory is an
excellent topic for a non-majors quantitative course as it develops mathematical models to understand human behavior in social, political, and economic
settings. The variety of applications can appeal to a broad range of students.
Additionally, students can learn mathematics through playing games, something many choose to do in their spare time!
This text particularly explores the ideas of game theory through the rich
context of popular culture. At the end of each chapter is a section on applications of the concepts to popular culture. It suggests films, television shows, and
novels with themes from game theory. The questions in each of these sections
are intended to serve as essay prompts for writing assignments.
Course Goals.
• Introduce students to the mathematics of game theory.
• Teach students how to use mathematical models to solve problems in
social and economic situations.
• Build students’ quantitative intuition.
• Introduce students to the power of mathematics to frame human behavior.
• Provide students an opportunity to use algebraic techniques, such as
linear models and systems of equations, in game theoretic applications.
• Provide students an opportunity to use basic ideas of probability, such
as expected value, in game theoretic applications.
Course Format. The material is presented in a discovery format, requiring
students to make conjectures frequently. Each section is structured as a class
activity. Any introduction material can be read by the students, and the numbered problems or questions are to be out in class and as homework, depending
on how far a particular student progresses through the section. Most sections
require students to attempt to solve the problem before they have been provided much framework. The sections then build the necessary tools to solve
the problem or understand the key ideas. Being able to compare their original
solutions and ideas to the more sophisticated mathematical ones helps build
v
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their mathematical intuition and helps them to understand the power of using
mathematics in situations where their intuition falls short.
Suggestions for Use. This text is primarily for use in a college-level quantitative reasoning course. It can also be used for an introductory course in
game theory for the social sciences. It approaches the subject matter through
an inquiry-based format. Most of the topics can be introduced by providing
the students with the activity to work through during class, followed by a discussion. Almost all of the activities are intended to work through the concepts
without additional lecture or introduction. Students with even a rudimentary background in algebra will find the material accessible. Any necessary
mathematical background can be introduced as needed.
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Chapter 1

What is Game Theory?

“Game Theory is not about ’playing games.’ It is about conflict resolution
among rational but distrustful beings.” Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, p.
39.
Although we will play many games throughout this book, our goal is to
understand how rational, distrustful players would play the game. These games
are meant to serve as models for situations of conflict. We will explore how
to “solve” games under certain assumptions about our players. As with any
mathematical model, we will need to make assumptions about how our players
will behave, what information they have, and the constraints of the game. For
example, we will assume that our players will use all information available to
them, and that players will follow the rules of the game.
Games can provide hours of recreational enjoyment, and are worth studying
for this alone. However, even simple games can be used to model political,
social, and economic interactions. Understanding some foundations of game
theory can help us interpret, predict, and respond in competitive situations.

1.1 Players and Strategies
In this book most of the games will be played by two players. Each player
must decide how he or she will play the game. In order to study games mathematically, we need to make some assumptions about how the players should
play the game. This allows us to be able to better predict what our players
should do. The following example illustrates the characteristics we will assume
about our players.

1.1.1 Example: Cake Division
How can two children fairly divide a cake? One classic solution is to have one
child cut the cake and have the other child choose a piece.
2
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Why does this work? In other words, why should both children feel they
received a fair share of the cake?
What are the underlying assumptions that make this process work?
1. The goal of each player is to get the largest piece. We can think of this
as each player acting in his or her self-interest.
2. Both players know that the other player has the same goal, and will act
to further this goal. Thus, we know that each player is rational. Even
more, each player knows the other player is rational.
We need both (1) and (2) to reach the solution that the cake is divided
evenly and both children receive equal sized pieces.
The idea that players are self-interested is crucial to game theory. There
are lots of other ways to play games, and those might be worth exploring.
But to get started with game theory, we must make specific assumptions and
develop the mathematical context from these assumptions.
Assumption 1: Players are self-interested. The goal is to win the most or
lose the least. But what does it mean to win?
A player’s payoff is the amount (points, money, or anything a player values)
a player receives for a particular outcome of a game. We say that the player’s
goal is to maximize his or her payoff. We should note that the maximum payoff
for a player might even be negative, in which case the player wants the least
negative (or closest to 0) payoff.
It is important to recognize the difference between having the goal of maximizing the payoff and having the goal of simply winning. Here are some
examples.
1. If two players were racing, a player wouldn’t just want to finish first, she
would want to finish by as large a margin as possible.
2. If two teams were playing basketball, the team wouldn’t want to just
have the higher score, they would want to win by the largest number of
points. In other words, a team would prefer to win by 10 points rather
than by 1 point.
3. In an election poll, a candidate doesn’t just want to be ahead of her
opponent, she wants lead by as large a margin as possible, (especially if
she needs to account for error in the polls).
It is important to keep in mind the the goal of each player is to win the
most (or lose the least). It will be tempting to look for strategies which simply
assure a player of a positive payoff, but we need to make sure a player can’t
do even better with a different strategy.
Assumption 2: Players are perfectly logical. A Player will always take
into account all available information and make the decision which maximizes
his payoff. This includes knowing that his opponent is also making the best
decision for herself. For example, in the cake cutting game a player wouldn’t
cut one large piece hoping that his opponent will by chance pick the smaller
piece. A player must assume that her opponent will always choose the larger
piece.
Now you may be wondering what these assumptions have to do with reality.
After all, no one’s perfect. But we often study ideal situations (especially in
math!). For example, you’ve all studied geometry. Can anyone here draw a
perfectly straight line? Yet, you’ve all studied such an object!
Our Goal: Develop strategies for our perfectly logical, self-interested players.
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1.1.2 Developing Strategies: Tic Tac Toe
Exercise 1.1.1 Play the game. Play several games of Tic TacToe with
an opponent. Make sure you take turns being the first player and the second
player. Develop a strategy for winning Tic Tac Toe. You may have a different
strategy for the first player and for the second player. Be as specific as possible.
You may need to consider several possibilities which depend on what your
opponent does.
a Who wins? Player 1 or Player 2?
b What must each player do in order to have the best possible outcome?
c How did you develop your strategy?
d How do you know it will always work?
Let us note some characteristics of Tic Tac Toe.
• There are two players.
• Players have perfect information. This means each player knows what all
of his or her own options are, what all of his or her opponent’s options are,
and both players know what the outcome of each option is. Additionally,
players know that both players have all of this information.
• This game has a solution. A solution for a game consists of a strategy
for each player and the outcome of the game when each player plays his
or her strategy. In Tic Tac Toe, if both players play their best, the game
will always end in a tie.
• The game is finite. This means the game must end after a finite number
of moves of turns. In other words, the game cannot go on forever. A
game that is not finite is called infinite. Note, an infinite game may end
after a finite number of turns, but there is no maximum number of turns
or process to ensure the game ends. In Tic Tac Toe, the game must end
after 9 or fewer turns.
Exercise 1.1.2 Perfect information, more examples. Can you think of
another example of a game with perfect information? What is an example of
a game that does not have perfect information?
Exercise 1.1.3 Finite and infinite, more examples. Give some examples
of finite games and infinite games.
Definition 1.1.4 A strategy for a player is a complete way to play the game
regardless of what the other player does.
♦
The choice of what a player does may depend on the opponent, but that choice
is predetermined before game play. For example, in the cake cutting game, it
doesn’t matter which piece the “chooser” will pick, the “cutter” will always cut
evenly. Similarly, it doesn’t matter how the cutter cuts, the chooser will always
pick the largest piece. In Tic Tac Toe, Player 2’s strategy should determine
his first move no matter what Player 1 plays first. For example, if Player 1
plays the center square, where should Player 2 play? If Player 1 plays a corner,
where should Player 2 play?
Exercise 1.1.5 Describe your favorite game. What is your favorite game?
a Give a brief description of the game, including what it means to “win”
or “lose” the game.
b How many players do you need?
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c Do the players have perfect information for the game?
d Is the game finite or can it go on forever?
e Give some possible strategies for the player(s). Note, depending on the
game, these strategies may not always result in a definite win, but they
should suggest a way to increase a player’s chances of winning (or not
losing).
We have established a few assumptions and looked at how to describe strategies in some familiar games. Not all games easily fit into the context we will be
using throughout this text. But you might keep in mind some of your favorite
games and see how well the strategies and solutions can be applied to them.
In the next section we develop some useful notation for describing most of the
games we will study.

1.2 Game Matrices and Payoff Vectors
We need a way to describe the possible choices for the players and the outcomes
of those choices. For now, we will stick with games that have only two players.
We will call them Player 1 and Player 2.

1.2.1 Example: Matching Pennies
Suppose each player has two choices: Heads (H) or Tails (T). If they choose
the same letter, then Player 1 wins $1 from Player 2. If they don’t match, then
Player 1 loses $1 to Player 2. We can represent all the possible outcomes of
the game with a matrix.
Player 1’s options will always correspond to the rows of the matrix, and
Player 2’s options will correspond to the columns. See Table 1.2.1.
Table 1.2.1 A game matrix showing the strategies for each player
Player 2
Head Tail
Player 1

Head
Tail

Definition 1.2.2 A payoff is the amount a player receives for given outcome
of the game.
♦
Now we can fill in the matrix with each player’s payoff. Since the payoffs
to each player are different, we will use ordered pairs where the first number is
Player 1’s payoff and the second number is Player 2’s payoff. The ordered pair
is called the payoff vector. For example, if both players choose H, then Player
1’s payoff is $1 and Player 2’s payoff is -$1 (since he loses to Player 1). Thus
the payoff vector associated with the outcome H, H is (1, −1).
We fill in the matrix with the appropriate payoff vectors in Table 1.2.3
Table 1.2.3 A game matrix showing the payoff vectors

Player 1

H
T

Player 2
H
T
(1, −1) (−1, 1)
(−1, 1) (1, −1)
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It is useful to think about different ways to quantify winning and losing.
What are some possible measures of value? For example, we could use money,
chips, counters, votes, points, amount of cake, etc.
Remember, a player always prefers to win the MOST points (money, chips,
votes, cake), not just more than her opponent. If you want to study a game
where players simply win or lose (such as Tic Tac Toe), we could just use “1”
for a win and “-1” for a loss.

1.2.2 Understanding the Players
Recall that we said there are two major assumptions we must make about our
players:
• Our players are self-interested. This means they will always prefer the
largest possible payoff. They will choose a strategy which maximizes
their payoff.
• Our players are perfectly logical. This means they will use all the information available and make the wisest choice for themselves.
It is important to note that each player also knows that his or her opponent
is also self-interested and perfectly logical!
Exercise 1.2.4 Preferred payoffs.
a Which payoff does the player prefer: 0, 2, or -2?
b Which payoff does the player prefer: -2, -5, or -10?
c Which payoff does the player prefer: -1, -3, or 0?
It may be strightforward to decide the best payoff for a player out of a list of
values, and it would be great if a player could just determine the biggest value
in the table and choose that strategy. However, when there are two players a
player may have to choose a strategy more carefully, since Player 1 can only
choose the row, and Player 2 can only choose the column. Thus, the outcome
of the game depends on BOTH players.
Example 1.2.5 A 2 × 2 Game. Suppose two players are playing a game
in which they can choose A or B with the payoffs given in the game matrix in
Table 1.2.6.
Table 1.2.6 Payoff matrix for Exercise 1.2.7
Player 2
Player 1

do.

A
B

A
(100, −100)
(0, 0)

B
(−10, 10)
(−1, 11)

In the following exercise, we will try to determine what each player should


Exercise 1.2.7 Finding strategies.
a Just by quickly looking at the matrix, which player appears to be able
to win more than the other player? Does one player seem to have an
advantage? Explain.
b Determine what each player should do. Explain your answer.
c Compare your answer in (b) to your answer in (a). Did the player you
suggested in (a) actually win more than the other player?

CHAPTER 1. WHAT IS GAME THEORY?

7

d According to your answer in (b), does Player 1 end up with the largest
possible payoff (for Player 1) in the matrix?
e According to your answer in (b), does Player 2 end up with the largest
possible payoff (for Player 2) in the matrix?
f Do you still think a player has an advantage in this game? Is it the same
answer as in (a)?
Example 1.2.8 A 3 × 3 Game. Suppose there are two players with the
game matrix given in Table 1.2.9.
Table 1.2.9 Payoff matrix for Exercise 1.2.10

Player 1

do.

A
B
C

X
(1000, −1000)
(200, −200)
(500, −500)

Player 2
Y
(−5, 5)
(0, 0)
(20, −20)

Z
(−15, 15)
(−5, 5)
(−25, 25)

In the following exercise, we will try to determine what each player should


Exercise 1.2.10 More practice finding strategies.
a Just by quickly looking at the matrix, which player appears to be able
to win more than the other player? Does one player seem to have an
advantage? Explain.
b Determine what each player should do. Explain your answer.
c Compare your answer in (b) to your answer in (a). Did the player you
suggested in (a) actually win more than the other player?
d According to your answer in (b), does Player 1 end up with the largest
possible payoff (for Player 1) in the matrix?
e According to your answer in (b), does Player 2 end up with the largest
possible payoff (for Player 2) in the matrix?
f Do you still think a player has an advantage in this game? Is it the same
answer as in (a)?
This chapter has introduced you to who the players are and how to organize
strategies and payoffs into a matrix. In the next chapter we will study some
methods for how a player can determine his or her best strategy.

Chapter 2

Two-Person Zero-Sum Games

In this chapter we will look at a specific type of two-player game. These are
often the first games studied in game theory as they can be straightforward to
analyze. All of our games in this chapter will have only two players. We will
also focus on games in which one player’s win is the other player’s loss.

2.1 Introduction to Two-Person Zero-Sum Games
In all of the examples from the last section, whatever one player won, the other
player lost.
Definition 2.1.1 A two player game is called a zero-sum game if the sum
of the payoffs to each player is constant for all possible outcomes of the game.
More specifically, the terms (or coordinates) in each payoff vector must add
up to the same value for each payoff vector. Such games are sometimes called
constant-sum games instead.
♦
We can always think of zero-sum games as being games in which one player’s
win is the other player’s loss.
Example 2.1.2 Zero-sum in Poker. Consider a poker game in which each
player comes to the game with $100. If there are five players, then the sum of
money for all five players is always $500. At any give time during the game,
a particular player may have more than $100, but then another player must
have less than $100. One player’s win is another player’s loss.

Example 2.1.3 Zero-sum in Cake Division. Consider the cake division
game. Determine the payoff matrix for this game. It is important to determine
what each player’s options are first: how can the “cutter” cut the cake? How
can the “chooser” pick her piece? The payoff matrix is given in Table 2.1.4.

8
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Table 2.1.4 Payoff matrix for Cake Cutting game.

Cutter

Cut Evenly
Cut Unvenly

Chooser
Larger Piece
Smaller Piece
(half, half)
(half, half)
(small piece, large piece) (large piece, small piece)

In order to better see that this game is zero-sum (or constant-sum), we
could give values for the amount of cake each player gets. For example, half
the cake would be 50%, a small piece might be 40%. Then we can rewrite the
matrix with the percentage values in Table 2.1.5
Table 2.1.5 Payoff matrix, in percent of cake, for Cake Cutting game.

Cutter

Cut Evenly
Cut Unvenly

Chooser
Larger Piece Smaller Piece
(50, 50)
(50, 50)
(40, 60)
(60, 40)

In each outcome, the payoffs to each player add up to 100 (or 100%). In
more mathematical terms, the coordinates of each payoff vector add up to 100.
Thus the sum is the same, or constant, for each outcome.

It is probably simple to see from the matrix in Table 2.1.5 that Player 2
will always choose the large piece, thus Player 1 does best to cut the cake
evenly. The outcome of the game is the strategy pair denoted [Cut Evenly,
Larger Piece], with resulting payoff vector (50, 50).
But why are we going to call these games “zero-sum” rather than “constantsum”? We can convert any zero-sum game to a game where the payoffs actually
sum to zero.
Example 2.1.6 Poker Payoffs Revisited. Consider the above poker game
where each player begins the game with $100. Suppose at some point in the
game the five players have the following amounts of money: $50, $200, $140,
$100. $10. Then we could think of their gain as -$50, $100, $40, $0, -$90.
What do these five numbers add up to?

Example 2.1.7 Convert the cake division payoffs so that the payoff vectors
sum to zero (rather than 100).
The solution is given in Table 2.1.8.
Table 2.1.8 Zero-sum payoff matrix for Cake Cutting game.

Cutter

Cut Evenly
Cut Unvenly

Chooser
Larger Piece Smaller Piece
(0, 0)
(0, 0)
(−10, 10)
(10, −10)

But let’s make sure we understand what these numbers mean. For example,
a payoff of (0, 0) does not mean each player gets no cake, it means they don’t
get any more cake than the other player. In this example, each player gets half
the cake (50%) plus the payoff.

In the form of Example 2.1.7, it is easy to recognize a zero-sum game since
each payoff vector has the form (a, −a) (or (−a, a)).

2.1.1 Example: An Election Campaign Game
Two candidates, Arnold and Bainbridge, are facing each other in a state election. They have three choices regarding the issue of the speed limit on I-5:
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They can support raising the speed limit to 70 MPH, they can support keeping the current speed limit, or they can dodge the issue entirely. The next three
examples present three different payoff matrices for Arnold and Bainbridge.
Example 2.1.9 The Speed Limit Issue. The candidates have the information given in Table 2.1.10 about how they would likely fare in the election
based on how they stand on the speed limit.
Table 2.1.10 Percentage of the vote for Example 2.1.9.

Arnold

Raise Limit
Keep Limit
Dodge

Raise Limit
(45, 55)
(60, 40)
(45, 55)

Bainbridge
Keep Limit
(50, 50)
(55, 45)
(55, 45)

Dodge
(40, 60)
(50, 50)
(40, 60)


Exercise 2.1.11 Anaylsis of the election game. For the following questions, assume Arnold and Bainbridge have the payoff matrix given in Example 2.1.9.
a Explain why Example 2.1.9 is a zero-sum game.
b What should Arnold choose to do? What should Bainbridge choose to
do? Be sure to explain each candidate’s choice. And remember, a player
doesn’t just want to win, he wants to get THE MOST votes– for example, you could assume these are polling numbers and that there is some
margin of error, thus a candidate prefers to have a larger margin over his
opponent!
c What is the outcome of the election?
d Does Arnold need to consider Bainbridge’s strategies is in order to decide
on his own strategy? Does Bainbridge need to consider Arnold’s strategies is in order to decide on his own strategy? Explain your answer.
Example 2.1.12 A New Scenario. Bainbridge’s mother is injured in
a highway accident caused by speeding. The new payoff matrix is given in
Table 2.1.13.
Table 2.1.13 Percentage of the vote for Example 2.1.12.

Arnold

Raise Limit
Keep Limit
Dodge

Raise Limit
(45, 55)
(60, 40)
(45, 55)

Bainbridge
Keep Limit
(10, 90)
(55, 45)
(10, 90)

Dodge
(40, 60)
(50, 50)
(40, 60)


Exercise 2.1.14 Anaysis of the second scenario. For the following
questions, assume Arnold and Bainbridge have the payoff matrix given in Example 2.1.12..
a Explain why Example 2.1.12 is a zero-sum game.
b What should Arnold choose to do? What should Bainbridge choose to
do? Be sure to explain each candidate’s choice.
c What is the outcome of the election?
d Does Arnold need to consider Bainbridge’s strategies is in order to decide
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on his own strategy? Does Bainbridge need to consider Arnold’s strategies is in order to decide on his own strategy? Explain your answer.
Example 2.1.15 A Third Scenario. Bainbridge begins giving election
speeches at college campuses and monster truck rallies. The new payoff matrix
is given in Table 2.1.16.
Table 2.1.16 Percentage of the vote for Example 2.1.15.

Arnold

Raise Limit
(35, 65)
(45, 55)
(40, 60)

Raise Limit
Keep Limit
Dodge

Bainbridge
Keep Limit
(10, 90)
(55, 45)
(10, 90)

Dodge
(60, 40)
(50, 50)
(65, 35)


Exercise 2.1.17 Analyis of the third scenario. For the following questions, assume Arnold and Bainbridge have the payoff matrix given in Example 2.1.15.
a Explain why Example 2.1.15 is a zero-sum game.
b What should Arnold choose to do? What should Bainbridge choose to
do? Be sure to explain each candidate’s choice.
c What is the outcome of the election?
d Does Arnold need to consider Bainbridge’s strategies is in order to decide
on his own strategy? Does Bainbridge need to consider Arnold’s strategies is in order to decide on his own strategy? Explain your answer.
Exercise 2.1.18 Changing the strategy. In each of the above scenarios,
is there any reason for Arnold or Bainbridge to change his strategy? If there
is, explain under what circumstances it makes sense to change strategy. If not,
explain why it never makes sense to change strategy.

2.1.2 Equilibrium Pairs
Chances are, in each of the exercises above, you were able to determine what
each player should do. In particular, if both players play your suggested strategies, there is no reason for either player to change to a different strategy.
Definition 2.1.19 A pair of strategies is an equilibrium pair if neither
player gains by changing strategies.
♦
For example, consider the game matrix from Example 1.2.5, Table 1.2.6.
Table 2.1.20 Payoff matrix for Example 1.2.5.

Player 1

A
B

Player 2
X
Y
(100, −100) (−10, 10)
(0, 0)
(−1, 11)

You determined that Player 2 should choose to play Y, and thus, Player 1
should play B (i.e., we have the strategy pair [B, Y]). Why is this an equilibrium
pair? If Player 2 plays Y, does Player 1 have any reason to change to strategy
A? No, she would lose 10 instead of 1! If Player 1 plays B, does Player 2
have any reason to change to strategy X? No, she would gain 0 instead of 1!
Thus neither player benefits from changing strategy, and so we say [B, Y] is
an equilibrium pair.
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For now, we can use a “guess and check” method for finding equilibrium
pairs. Take each outcome and decide whether either player would prefer to
switch. Remember, Player 1 can only choose a different row, and Player 2 can
only choose a different column. In our above example there are four outcomes
to check: [A, X], [A, Y], [B, X], and [B, Y]. We already know [B, Y] is an
equilibrium pair, but let’s check the rest. Suppose the players play [A, X].
Does Player 1 want to switch to B? No, she’d rather get 100 than 0. Does
player 2 want to switch to Y? Yes! She’d rather get 10 than -100. So [A, X] is
NOT an equilibrium pair since a player wants to switch. Now check that for
[A, Y] Player 1 would want to switch, and for [B, X] both players would want
to switch. Thus [A, Y] and [B, X] are NOT equilibrium pairs. Now you can
try to find equilibrium pairs in any matrix game by just checking each payoff
vector to see if one of the players would have wanted to switch to a different
strategy.
Exercise 2.1.21 Checking equilibrium pairs. Are the strategy pairs you
determined in the three election scenarios equilibrium pairs? In other words,
would either player prefer to change strategies? (You don’t need to check
whether any other strategies are equilibrium pairs.)
Exercise 2.1.22 Using “guess and check”. Use the “guess and check”
method to determine any equilibrium pairs for the following payoff matrices.
a

b

c



(2, −2) (2, −2)
(1, −1) (3, −3)


(3, −3) (1, −1)
(2, −2) (4, −4)

(4, −4)
(3, −3)

(5, −5)
(0, 0)

(4, −4)
(1, −1)



After trying the above examples, do you think every game has an equilibrium pair? Can games have multiple equilibrium pairs?
Exercise 2.1.23 Existence of equilibrium pairs.
equilibrium pairs?

Do all games have

Exercise 2.1.24 Multiple equilibrium pairs. Can a game have more than
one equilibrium pair?
The last three exercises give you a few more games to practice with.
Exercise 2.1.25 Rock, paper, scissors. Consider the game ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS (Rock beats Scissors, Scissors beat Paper, Paper beats Rock).
Construct the payoff matrix for this game. Does it have an equilibrium pair?
Explain your answer.
Exercise 2.1.26 Battle of the networks. Two television networks are
battling for viewers for 7 pm Monday night. They each need to decide if they
are going to show a sitcom or a sporting event. Table 2.1.27 gives the payoffs
as percent of viewers.
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Table 2.1.27 Payoff matrix for Battle of the Networks.

Network 1

Network 2
Sitcom Sports
(55, 45) (52, 48)
(50, 50) (45, 55)

Sitcom
Sports

a Explain why this is a zero-sum game.
b Does this game have an equilibrium pair? If so, find it and explain what
each network should do.
c Convert this game to one in which the payoffs actually sum to zero. Hint:
if a network wins 60% of the viewers, how much more than 50% of the
viewers does it have?
Exercise 2.1.28 Competitive advantage. This game is an example of
what economists call Competitive Advantage. Two competing firms need to
decide whether or not to adopt a new type of technology. The payoff matrix is
in Table 2.1.29. The variable a is a positive number representing the economic
advantage a firm will gain if it is the first to adopt the new technology.
Table 2.1.29 Payoff matrix for Competitive Advantage.

Firm B

Adopt New Tech
Stay Put

Firm A
Adopt New Tech Stay Put
(0, 0)
(a, −a)
(−a, a)
(0, 0)

a Explain the payoff vector for each strategy pair. For example, why should
the pair [Adopt New Tech, Stay Put] have the payoff (a, −a)?
b Explain what each firm should do.
c Give a real life example of Competitive Advantage.
We’ve seen how to describe a zero-sum game and how to find equilibrium
pairs. We’ve tried to decide what each player’s strategy should be. Each player
may need to consider the strategy of the other player in order to determine
his or her best strategy. But we need to be careful, although our intuition can
be useful in deciding the best strategy, we’d like to be able to be more precise
about finding strategies for each player. We’ll learn some of these tools in the
next section.

2.2 Dominated Strategies
Recall that in a zero-sum game, we know that one player’s win is the other
player’s loss. Furthermore, we know we can rewrite any zero-sum game so
that the player’s payoffs are in the form (a, −a). Note, this works even if a is
negative; in which case, −a is positive.
Example 2.2.1 A Simpler Payoff Matrix. Consider the zero-sum game
with payoff matrix in Table 2.2.2. Note that for simplicity our payoff matrix
contains only the payoffs and not the strategy names; but Player 1 still chooses
a row and Player 2 still chooses a column.
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Table 2.2.2 The payoff matrix for Example 2.2.1.
Player 1

Player 2
(1, −1) (−0, 0)
(−1, 1) (−2, 2)

If we know we are playing a zero-sum game, then the use of ordered pairs
seems somewhat redundant: If Player 1 wins 1, then we know that Player 2
must lose 1 (win −1). Thus, if we KNOW we are playing a zero-sum game, we
can simplify our notation by just using Player 1’s payoffs. The above matrix
in Table 2.2.2 can be simplified as in Table 2.2.3.
Table 2.2.3 The payoff matrix for Example 2.2.1 using only Player
1’s payoffs.
Player 1

Player 2
1
0
-1
-2


When simplifying, keep a few things in mind:
1. You MUST know that the game is zero-sum.
2. If it is not otherwise specified, the payoffs represent Player 1’s payoffs.
3. You can always give a similar matrix representing Player 2’s payoffs.
However, due to (2), you should indicate that the matrix is for Player 2.
For example, Player 2’s payoff matrix would be given by Table 2.2.4.
Table 2.2.4 The payoff matrix for Example 2.2.1 using only
Player 2’s payoffs.
Player 1

Player 2
-1
0
1
2

4. Both players can make strategy decisions by considering only Player 1’s
payoff matrix. (Why?) Just to test this out, by looking only at the matrix
in Table 2.2.3 determine which strategy each player should choose.
Table 2.2.5 Player 1’s payoffs in Example 2.2.1.
Player 1

Player 2
1
0
-1
-2

In this last example, it should be clear that Player 1 is looking for rows
which give her the largest payoff. This is nothing new. However, Player 2 is
now looking for columns which give Player 1 the SMALLEST payoff. (Why?)
Now that we have simplified our notation for zero-sum games, let’s try to
find a way to determine the best strategy for each player.
Example 2.2.6
Table 2.2.7.

A 2 × 3 Game.

Consider the zero-sum game given in

Table 2.2.7 Payoff matrix for Example 2.2.6.
Player 1

Player 2
1
0 2
-1 -2 2
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Determine which row Player 1 should choose. Is there any situation in
which Player 1 would choose the other row?

Example 2.2.8 Another 2 × 3 Game. Consider the zero-sum game given
in Table 2.2.9.
Table 2.2.9 Payoff matrix for Example 2.2.8.
Player 2
1
0
2
-1 -2 3

Player 1

Determine which row Player 1 should choose. Is there any situation in
which Player 1 would choose the other row?

In Example 2.2.6, no matter what Player 2 does, Player 1 would always
choose Row 1, since every payoff in Row 1 is greater than or equal to the
corresponding payoff in Row 2 (1 ≥ −1, 0 ≥ −2, 2 ≥ 2). In Example 2.2.8,
this is not the case: if Player 2 were to choose Column 3, then Player 1 would
prefer Row 2. In Example 2.2.6 we would say that Row 1 dominates Row 2.
Definition 2.2.10 A strategy X dominates a strategy Y if every entry for
X is greater than or equal to the corresponding entry for Y . In this case, we
say Y is dominated by X.
If strategy X dominates stratgy Y , we can write X  Y .
♦
In mathematical notation, let aik be the value in the ith row and k th column.
Similarly, ajk is the value in the j th row and k th column. The ith row dominates
the j th row if aik ≥ ajk for all k, and aik > ajk for at least one k.
This definition can also be used for Player 2: we consider columns instead
of rows. If we are looking at Player 1’s payoffs, then Player 2 prefers smaller
payoffs. Thus one column X dominates another column Y if all the entries in
X are smaller than or equal to the corresponding entries in Y .
Here is the great thing: we can always eliminate dominated strategies!
(Why?) Thus, in Example 2.2.6, we can eliminate Row 2, as in Figure 2.2.11.
Player 2
1

0

2

-1

-2

2

Player 1

Figure 2.2.11 Row 2 is dominated by Row 1.
Now it is easy to see what Player 2 should do.
In Example 2.2.8, we cannot eliminate Row 2 since it is not dominated
by Row 1. However, it should be clear that Column 2 dominates Column
3 (remember, Player 2 prefers SMALLER values). Thus we can eliminate
Column 3 as in Figure 2.2.12.
Player 2
1

0

2

-1

-2

3

Player 1

Figure 2.2.12 Column 3 is dominated by Column 2.
AFTER eliminating Column 3, Row 1 dominates Row 2. Now, in Figure 2.2.13 we can eliminate Row 2.
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Player 2
1

0

2

-1

-2

3

Player 1

Figure 2.2.13 After eliminating Column 3, Row 2 is dominated by Row 1.
Again, now it is easy to determine what each player should do.
Exercise 2.2.14 Check equilibrium pairs. Check that the strategy pairs
we determined in Example 2.2.6 and Example 2.2.8 are, in fact, equilibrium
pairs.
Now, look back at the election examples from Subsection 2.1.1 and apply
the process of eliminating dominated strategies.
Exercise 2.2.15 Eliminating dominated strategies. Use the idea of eliminating dominated strategies to determine what each player should do in the
Arnold/ Bainbridge examples in Table 2.1.10, Table 2.1.13, and Table 2.1.16.
Do you get the same strategy pairs as you determined in the related exercises
(Exercise 2.1.11, Exercise 2.1.14, Exercise 2.1.17)?
The next three exercises provide more practice in using dominated strategies to find equilibrium pairs.
Exercise 2.2.16 More practice with dominated strategies. Use the
idea of eliminating dominated strategies to determine any equilibrium pairs in
the zero-sum game given in Table 2.2.17. Note, since it is a zero-sum game we
need only show Player 1’s payoffs. Explain all the steps in your solution. If
you are unable to find an equilibrium pair, explain what goes wrong.
Table 2.2.17 Payoff matrix for Exercise 2.2.16.

Player 1

A
B
C
D

Player 2
W X Y Z
1
0
0 10
-1 0 -2 9
1
1
1
8
-2 0
0
7

Exercise 2.2.18 Determine equilibrium pairs. Determine any equilibrium pairs in the zero-sum game given in Table 2.2.19. Explain all the steps in
your solution. If you are unable to find an equilibrium pair, explain what goes
wrong.
Table 2.2.19 Payoff matrix for Exercise 2.2.18.

Player 1

A
B
C
D

W
1
0
-1
0

Player 2
X Y
2
3
-1 -0
3
2
1 -1

Z
4
5
4
1

Exercise 2.2.20 Practice finding equilibrium pairs. Determine any
equilibrium pairs in the zero-sum game given in Table 2.2.21. Explain all the
steps in your solution. If you are unable to find an equilibrium pair, explain
what goes wrong.
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Table 2.2.21 Payoff matrix for Exercise 2.2.20.

Player 1

A
B
C
D

W
-2
1
10
0

Player 2
X
Y
0
3
-2
-3
-10 -1
0
10

Z
20
0
1
15

Exercise 2.2.22 A more challenging example. Determine any equilibrium pairs in the zero-sum game given in Table 2.2.23. Explain all the steps in
your solution. If you are unable to find an equilibrium pair, explain what goes
wrong.
Table 2.2.23 Payoff matrix for Exercise 2.2.22.

Player 1

A
B
C
D

W
-2
1
10
0

Player 2
X
Y
0
3
-2
-5
-10 -1
0
10

Z
20
-3
1
8

Chances are you had trouble determining an equilibrium pair for the game
in Exercise 2.2.22. Does this mean there isn’t an equilibrium pair? Not necessarily, but we are stuck if we try to use only the idea of eliminating dominated
strategies. So we need a new method.
We might think of our next method as the “worst case scenario,” or “extremely defensive play.” The idea is that we want to assume our opponent is
the best player to ever live. In fact, we might assume our opponent is telepathic. So no matter what we do, our opponent will always guess what we are
going to choose.
Example 2.2.24 Playing Against the Best. Assume you are Player 1,
and you are playing against this “infinitely smart” Player 2. Consider the game
in Table 2.2.17. If you pick row A, what will Player 2 do? Player 2 will pick
column X or Y. Try this for each of the rows. Which row is your best choice?
If you pick A, you will get 0; if you pick B, you will get −2; if you pick C,
you will get 1; and if you pick D you will get −2. Thus, your best choice is to
choose C and get 1. Now assume you are Player 2, and Player 1 is “infinitely
smart.” Which column is your best choice? If you pick W, Player 1 will get
1 (you will get −1); if you pick X, Player 1 will get 1; if you pick Y, Player 1
will get 1; and if you pick Z, you will get 10. Thus, you can choose W, X, or
Y (since you want Player 1 to win the least) and get −1.

Exercise 2.2.25 A new method. Using the method described in Example 2.2.24, determine what each player should do in the game in Table 2.2.19.
Exercise 2.2.26 More practice with the new method. Using the method
described in Example 2.2.24, determine what each player should do in the game
in Table 2.2.21.
After working through a few examples can you describe more generally the
process used in Example 2.2.24? What is Player 1 looking for in each row?
Then how does she choose which row to play? What is Player 2 looking for in
each column? How does he choose which column to play?
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Exercise 2.2.27 Generalizing the new method. Generalize the method
described in Example 2.2.24. In other words, give a general rule for how Player
1 should determine his or her best move. Do the same for Player 2.
Exercise 2.2.28 The new method and equlibrium points. What do you
notice about using this method on the games in Tables 2.2.17, Table 2.2.19,
and Table 2.2.21? Is the solution an equilibrium pair?
Exercise 2.2.29 The new method on the challenging example. Now
try this method on the elusive payoff matrix in Table 2.2.23. What should each
player do? Do you think we get an equilibrium pair? Explain.
The strategies we found using the above method have a more official name.
Player 1’s strategy is called the maximin strategy. Player 1 is maximizing
the minimum values from each row. Player 2’s strategy is called the minimax
strategy. Player 2 is minimizing the maximum values from each column. Notice, we can find the maximin and minimax strategies for any zero-sum game.
But do our players always want to use these strategies? Will they always result
in an equilibrium pair? The next five exercises explore these questions.
Exercise 2.2.30 Look for dominated strategies. Let’s consider another
game matrix, given in Table 2.2.31. Explain why you cannot use dominated
strategies to find an equilibrium pair. Do you think there is an equilibrium
pair for this game (why or why not)?
Table 2.2.31 Payoff matrix for Exercise 2.2.30.

Player 1

A
B
C
D

W
-2
1
10
0

Player 2
X
Y
0
3
2
-3
-10 -1
0
10

Z
20
0
1
15

Exercise 2.2.32 Find the maximin/minimax strategy. If both players use the maximin/ minimax strategy, what is the outcome of the game in
Table 2.2.31?
Exercise 2.2.33 Predicting a maximin strategy. In the game in Table 2.2.31, if Player 1’s opponent can guess that Player 1 will choose to use a
maximin strategy, is Player 1 better off not using the maximin strategy?
Exercise 2.2.34 Deviating from the maxinmin/minimax strategy.
Suppose both players initially decide to use the minimax/ maximin strategy in
the game in Table 2.2.31. Is Player 1 better off choosing a different strategy? If
Player 2 guesses a change, is Player 2 better off changing strategies? Continue
this line of reasoning for several iterations. What strategies do each of the
players choose? Is at least one player always better off switching strategies?
Can we conclude that the maximin/ minimax strategy does not lead to an
equilibrium pair?
Exercise 2.2.35 Comparing examples. Compare your answers in Exercise 2.2.34 to what happens in Exercise 2.2.16, Exercise 2.2.18, and Exercise 2.2.20. Can you identify any key differences between the games in Exercise 2.2.34 and Exercise 2.2.16, Exercise 2.2.18, and Exercise 2.2.20?
Given a zero-sum matrix game, we can find equilibruim pairs (if they exist)
by the “guess and check” method, by eliminating dominated strategies, and by
looking for the minimax/maximin strategies. You should be able to apply all
three methods and think about which method might be the most appropriate

CHAPTER 2. TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES

19

for a given matrix game. For example, although “guess and check” should
always find an equilibrium point if it exists, it may be very tedious to apply to
a really large matrix. The maximin/minimax method might be much faster.

2.3 Probability and Expected Value
Many games have an element of chance. In order to model such games and determine strategies, we should understand how mathematicians use probability
to represent chance.

2.3.1 Some Basic Probability
You are probably a little bit familiar with the idea of probability. People
often talk about the chance of some event happening. For example, a weather
forecast might say there is a 20% chance of rain. Now determining the chance
of rain can be difficult, so we will stick with some easier examples.
Consider a standard deck of 52 playing cards. What is the chance of drawing
a red card? What is the probability of drawing a red card? Is there a difference
between chance and probability? Yes! The probability of an event has a very
specific meaning in mathematics.
The probability of an event E is the number of different outcomes resulting
in E divided by the total number of equally likely outcomes. In mathematical
symbols,
P (E) =

number of different outcomes resulting in E
.
total number of equally likely outcomes

Notice that the probability of E will always be a number between 0 and 1.
An impossible event will have probability 0; an event that always occurs will
have probability 1.
Thus, the probability of drawing a red card is 12 , not 50%. Although we
can convert between probability and percent (since 0.5 converted to percent is
50%), it is important to answer a question about probability with a probability,
not a percent.
Example 2.3.1 Drawing a Particular Suit. Given a standard deck of
playing cards, what is the probability of drawing a heart?
Answer: You might say since there are four suits, and one of the suits is
hearts, you have a probability of 41 . You’d be correct, but be careful with this
reasoning. This works because each suit has the same number of cards, so each
suit is equally likely. Another way the calculate the probability is to count the
number of hearts (13) divided by the number of cards (52). Thus, we get a
1

probability of 13
52 = 4 = 0.25.
Example 2.3.2 A Card is Missing. Now suppose the ace of spades is
missing from the deck. What is the probability of drawing a heart?
Answer: As before, there are still four suits in the deck, so it might be
tempting to say the probability is still 14 . But we’d be wrong! Each suit is no
longer equally likely since, it is slightly less likely that we draw a spade. Each
individual card is still equally likely, though. So now
P (drawing a heart) =

number of hearts
13
=
= 0.255.
number of cards
51

As you can see, it is now slightly more likely that we draw a heart if the
ace of spades is removed from the deck.
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Now try to compute some probabilities on your own.
Exercise 2.3.3 Probability with a single die. Consider rolling a single
die. List the possible outcomes. Assuming that it is a fair die, are all the
outcomes equally likely? What is the probability of rolling a 2? What is the
probability of rolling an even number?
Exercise 2.3.4 Probability with red and green dice. Now consider
rolling two fair dice, say a red die and a green die.
a How many equally likely outcomes are there? List them.
b What is the probability that you get a two on the red die and a four on
the green die?
c What is the probability that you roll a three on the red die?
d What is the probability that you roll a two and a four?
e What is the probability that you roll a three?
f Compare your answers in (b) and (c) with your answers in (d) and (e).
Are they the same or different? Explain.
Exercise 2.3.5 Probability with two of the same dice. Again consider
rolling two fair dice, but now we don’t care what color they are.
a Does this change the number of equally likely outcomes from Exercise 2.3.4?
Why or why not? It may be helpful to list the possible outcomes.
b What is the probability that you get snake eyes (two ones)?
c What is the probability that you roll a two and a four?
d What is the probability that you roll a three?
e What is the probability that you roll a two OR a four?
Exercise 2.3.6 Sums of dice. Suppose we roll two dice and add them.
a List the possible sums.
b What is the probability that you get a total of seven on the two dice?
c What is the probability that you get a total of four when you roll two
dice?
d Are the events of getting a total of seven and getting a total of four
equally likely? Explain.
It is important to note that just because you can list all of the possible
outcomes, they may not be equally likely. As we see from Exercise 2.3.6,
although there are 11 possible sums, the probability of getting any particular
1
sum (such as seven) is not 11
.

2.3.2 Expected Value
Definition 2.3.7 The expected value of a game of chance is the average net
gain or loss that we would expect per game if we played the game many times.
We compute the expected value by multiplying the value of each outcome by
its probability of occurring and then add up all of the products.
♦
For example, suppose you toss a fair coin: Heads, you win 25 cents, Tails,
you lose 25 cents. The probability of getting Heads is 1/2, as is the probability
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of getting Tails. The expected value of the game is

 

1
1
× .25 +
× (−.25) = 0.
2
2
Thus, you would expect an average payoff of $0, if you were to play the
game several times. Note, the expected value is not necessarily the actual value
of playing the game.
Exercise 2.3.8 Expected value and a two-coin game. Consider a game
where you toss two coins. If you get two Heads, you win $2. If you get a Head
and a Tail, you win $1, if you get two Tails, you lose $4. Find the expected
value of the game. (Caution: first you need to find the probability of each
event– think about “equally likely” events.)
Exercise 2.3.9 Play the two-coin game. Now play the game in Exercise 2.3.8 the indicated number of times. Give your actual payoff and compare
it to the expected value.
a One time.
b Ten times.
c Twenty-five times.
d Is there a single possible outcome where you would actually win or lose
the exact amount computed for the expected value? If not, why do we
call it the expected value?
Exercise 2.3.10 Expected value of roulette. A standard roulette wheel
has 38 numbered slots for a small ball to land in: 36 are marked from 1 to 36,
with half of those black and half red; two green slots are numbered 0 and 00.
An allowable bet is to bet on either red of black. This bet is an even money
bet, which means if you win you receive twice what you bet. Many people
think that betting black or red is a fair game. What is the expected value of
betting $1000 on red? Is this a fair game? Explain.
Exercise 2.3.11 Another roulette example. Considering again the roulette
wheel, if you bet $100 on a particular number and the ball lands on that number, you win $3600. What is the expected value of betting $100 on Red 4?
After finding the expected value of the games in the above exercises, what
do you think the expected value can tell us about a game? Can you use it
to decide whether you should play that game of chance or not? When will a
game be advantageous for the player? We often care whether a game is “fair.”
Can the expected value help you determine if a game is fair?
Exercise 2.3.12 Expected value and fairness. Use the idea of expected
value to explain “fairness” in a game of chance.
The last exercise is a good challenge for exploring expected value.
Exercise 2.3.13 A betting game with two dice. You place a bet and
roll two fair dice. If you roll a 7 or an 11, you receive your bet back (you break
even). If you roll a 2, a 3, or a 12, then you lose your bet. If you roll anything
else, you receive half of the sum you rolled in dollars. How much should you
bet to make this a fair game?
Hint. It might be helpful to begin with a table showing the possible sums,
their probability, and the payoff for each.
In the next section we use the ideas of probability and expected value to
understand how set up a payoff matrix for a game of chance.
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2.4 A Game of Chance
Now that we have worked with expected value, we can begin to analyze some
simple games that involve an element of chance.
Example 2.4.1 One-Card Stud Poker. We begin with a deck of cards
in which 50% are Aces (you can use Red cards for Aces) and 50% are Kings
(you can use Black cards for Kings). There are two players and one dealer.
The play begins by each player putting in the ante (1 chip). Each player is
dealt one card face down. WITHOUT LOOKING AT HIS OR HER CARD,
the players decide to Bet (say, 1 chip) or Fold. Players secretly show the dealer
their choice. If one player bet and the other folded, then the player who bet
wins. If both bet or both fold, then Ace beats King (or Red beats Black);
winner takes the pot (all the chips from the ante and any bets). If there is a
tie, they split the pot.

Exercise 2.4.2 Play One-Card Stud Poker. Play the game several times
with two other people (so you have two players and a dealer), keeping track of
the strategy choices of the players and the resulting payoffs.
Exercise 2.4.3 Guess a strategy. Based on playing the game, determine
a possible winning strategy.
Exercise 2.4.4 Check if zero-sum. Is this a zero-sum game? Why or why
not?
Exercise 2.4.5 Relationship between the deal and the strategy. Does
the actual deal affect the choice of strategy?
Exercise 2.4.6 Strategy choices. On any given deal, what strategy choices
does a player have?
Before moving on, you should attempt to determine the payoff matrix.
The remainder of this section will be more meaningful if you have given some
thought to what the payoff matrix should be. It is OK to be wrong at this
point, it is not OK to not try.
Exercise 2.4.7 Determine a possible payoff matrix. Write down a
possible payoff matrix for this game.
Now let’s work through creating the payoff matrix for One-Card Stud Poker.
Exercise 2.4.8 Payoff for [Bet, Fold]. If Player 1 Bets and Player 2 Folds,
does it matter which cards were dealt? How much does Player 1 win? How
much does Player 2 lose? What is the payoff vector for [Bet, Fold]? (Keep in
mind your answer to Exercise 2.4.4.)
Exercise 2.4.9 Payoff for [Fold, Bet]. If Player 1 Folds and Player 2 Bets,
does it matter which cards were dealt? What is the payoff vector for [Fold,
Bet]?
Exercise 2.4.10 Payoff and the actual deal. If both players Bet, does
the payoff depend on which cards were dealt?
To determine the payoff vector for [Bet, Bet] and [Fold, Fold] we will need
to consider which cards were dealt. We can use some probability to determine
the remaining payoff vectors.
Exercise 2.4.11 Probability of each deal. There are four possible outcomes of the deal– list them. What is the probability that each occurs? (Remember: the probability of an event is a number between 0 and 1.)
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Exercise 2.4.12 Payoff for each deal with [Bet, Bet]. Consider the pair
of strategies [Bet, Bet]. For each possible deal, determine the payoff vector.
For example, if the players are each dealt an Ace (Red), how much does each
player win? (Again, keep in mind your answer to Exercise 2.4.4.)
In order to calculate the payoff for [Bet, Bet], we need to take a weighted
average of the possible payoff vectors in Exercise 2.4.12. In particular, we will
“weight” a payoff by the probability that it occurs. Recall that this is the
expected value. We will calculate the expected value separately for each player.
Exercise 2.4.13 Player 1’s expected value for [Bet, Bet]. Find the
expected value for [Bet, Bet] for Player 1.
Exercise 2.4.14 Player 2’s expected value for [Bet, Bet]. Find the
expected value for [Bet, Bet] for Player 2.
The pair of expected values from Exercise 2.4.13 and Exercise 2.4.14 is the
payoff vector for [Bet, Bet].
Exercise 2.4.15 Justify using expected value as the payoff. Explain
why it should make sense to use the expected values for the payoffs in the
matrix for the strategy pair [Bet, Bet].
Hint. Think about what a player needs to know to choose a strategy in a
game of chance.
We can use a similar process to find the payoff vector for [Fold, Fold].
Exercise 2.4.16 Repeat for [Fold, Fold]. Repeat Exercise 2.4.12, Exercise 2.4.13, and Exercise 2.4.14 for the pair of strategies [Fold, Fold].
Exercise 2.4.17 Complete payoff matrix. Summarize the above work by
giving the completed payoff matrix for One-Card Stud Poker.
Now that you have done all the hard work of finding the payoff matrix
for One-Card Stud Poker, we can analyze our two-player zero-sum game using
the techniques we learned in the previous sections. It is also important to
see how the mathematical solution compares to our conjectured solution from
Exercise 2.4.3.
Exercise 2.4.18 Best strategy for One-Card Stud. Use the payoff matrix
to determine the best strategy for each player. If each player uses their best
strategy, what will be the outcome of the game?
Exercise 2.4.19 Compare strategies. Compare the strategy you found
in Exercise 2.4.18 to your suggested strategy in Exercise 2.4.3. In particular,
discuss how knowing the payoff matrix might have changed your strategy. Also
compare the payoff that results from the strategy in Exercise 2.4.18 to the
payoff that results from your original strategy in Exercise 2.4.3 .
Since One-Card Stud Poker has an element of chance, we should see what
happens if we play the game several times using the strategy from Exercise 2.4.18.
Exercise 2.4.20 Payoff for repeated One-Card Stud. Use the payoff
matrix to predict what the payoff to each player would be if the game is played
ten times.
Exercise 2.4.21 Play repeated One-Card Stud. Play the game ten
times using the best strategy. How much has each player won or lost after ten
hands of One-Card Stud Poker? Compare your answer to your prediction in
Exercise 2.4.20. Does the actual payoff differ from the theoretical payoff? If
so, why do you think this might be?
Exercise 2.4.22 Fair game. Explain why this game is considered fair.
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Example 2.4.23 Generalized One-Card Stud Poker. In One-Card Stud
Poker we anted one chip and bet one chip. Now, suppose we let players ante
a different amount and bet a different amount (although players will still ante
and bet the same amount as each other). Suppose a player antes a and bets b.
How might this change the game?

Exercise 2.4.24 Payoff matrix for Generalized One-Card Stud. Use
the method outlined for One-Card Stud Poker to determine the payoff matrix
for Generalized One-Card Stud Poker.
Exercise 2.4.25 Strategy for Generalized One-Card Stud. Does the
strategy change for the generalized version of the game? Explain.
Now that we have analyzed several zero-sum games, we can see how important is is to find any equilibrium pairs. In the next section we explore
equilibrium strategies in more detail.

2.5 Equilibrium Points
In this section, we will try to gain a greater understanding of equilibrium
strategies in a game. In general, we call the pair of equilibrium strategies an
equilibrium pair, while we call the specific payoff vector associated with an
equilibrium pair an equilibrium point.
Exercise 2.5.1 Find equilibrium points.
point(s) for the following games.


(2, −2) (−1, 1)
a
(2, −2) (−1, 1)


(0, 0) (−1, 1) (0, 0)
b (−1, 1) (0, 0) (−1, 1)
(0, 0) (1, −1) (0, 0)

Determine the equilibrium

Exercise 2.5.2 An observation about equilibrium points. What do you
notice about the values of the equilibrium points of the games in Exercise 2.5.1?
The big question we want to answer is “Can two equilibrium points for a
two-player zero-sum game have different values?” By experimenting with some
examples, try to create an example of a game with two equilibrium points where
those points have different values for one of the players. If you can successfully
create such an example, you will have answered the question. But just because
you can’t find an example, that doesn’t mean one doesn’t exist!
After trying several examples, you might be beginning to believe that the
answer to the above question is “no.” Now you are ready to try to prove the
following theorem:
Solution Theorem for Zero-Sum Games. Every equilibrium point of a
two-person zero-sum game has the same value.
Let’s start with the 2 × 2 case. We will use a proof by contradiction. We
will assume the theorem is false and show that we get a logical contradiction.
Once we reach a logical contradiction (a statement that is both true and false),
we can conclude we were wrong to assume the theorem was false; hence, the
theorem must be true. Make sure you are comfortable with the logic of this
before moving on.
Since we want to assume the theorem is false, we assume we have a twoplayer zero-sum game with two different equilibrium values. Since we don’t
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have a specific example of such a game, we want to represent the game in a
general form. In particular, we can represent the general game


(a, −a) (c, −c)
.
(d, −d) (b, −b)
Note that if a is negative, then −a is positive; thus, every possible set of
values is represented by this matrix. We want to look at the possible cases for
equilibria.
Exercise 2.5.3 Equilibria in Column 1. Explain what goes wrong if
(a, −a) and (d, −d) are equilibria with a 6= d.
Hint.

Think about the different cases, such as a < d, a > d.

Exercise 2.5.4 Equilibria in the same column/row. Generalize you
answer to Exercise 2.5.3 to explain what goes wrong if the two equilibria are
in the same column. Similarly, explain what happens if the two equilibria are
in the same row.
Exercise 2.5.5 Diagonal equilibria. Does the same explanation hold if the
two equilibria are diagonal from each other? (Explain your answer!)
From your last answer, you should see that we need to do more work to
figure out what happens if the equilibria are diagonal. So let’s assume that the
two equilibria are (a, −a) and (b, −b) with a 6= b. It might be helpful to draw
the payoff matrix and circle the equilibria.
Exercise 2.5.6 A player prefers the value of an equilibrium. Construct
a system of inequalities using the fact that a player prefers an equilibrium point
to another choice. For example, Player 1 prefers a to d. Thus, a > d. List
all four inequalities you can get using this fact. You should get two for each
player– remember that Player 1 can only compare values in the same column
since he has no ability to switch columns. If necessary, convert all inequalities
to ones without negatives. (Algebra review: −5 < −2 means 5 > 2!)
Exercise 2.5.7 Create strings of inequalities. Now string your inequalities together. For example, if a < b and b < c then we can write a < b < c. (Be
careful, the inequalities must face the same way; we cannot write a > b < c!)
Exercise 2.5.8 You now have a contradiction. Explain why you now
have a contradiction (a statement that must be false). We can now conclude
that our assumption that a 6= b was wrong.
Exercise 2.5.9 Diagonal case for c and d. Repeat the above argument
(Exercise 2.5.6, Exercise 2.5.7, and Exercise 2.5.8) for the case that the two
equilibria are (d, −d) and (c, −c) with d 6= c.
Exercise 2.5.10 Summarize conclusion. Explain why you can conclude
that all equilibria in a 2 × 2 two-player zero-sum game have the same value.
We just worked through the proof, step-by-step, but now you need to put
all the ideas together for yourself.
Exercise 2.5.11 The complete proof. Write up the complete proof for the
2 × 2 case in your own words.
Exercise 2.5.12 Generalizing to a larger game. Can you see how you
might generalize to a larger game matrix? You do not need to write up a proof
of the general case, just explain how the key ideas from the 2 × 2 case would
apply to a bigger game matrix.
Hint. Think about equilibria in (a) the same row, (b) in the same column,
or (c) in a different row and column.
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We’ve seen that any two equlibrium points must have the same value. However, it is important to note that just because an outcome has the same value
as an equilibrium point, that does not mean it is also an equilibrium point.
Exercise 2.5.13 Equal values may not be equilibria. Give a specific
example of a game matrix with two outcomes that are (0, 0), where one is an
equilibrium point and the other is not.
Working through the steps of a mathematical proof can be challenging. As
you think about what we did in this section, first make sure you understand
the argument for each step. Then work on understanding how the steps fit
together to create the larger argument.
The next section summarizes all our work with finding equilibrium points
for zero-sum games.

2.6 Strategies for Zero-Sum Games and Equilibrium Points
Throughout this chapter, we have been trying to find solutions for two player
zero-sum games by deciding what two rational players should do. In this
section, we will try to understand where we are with solving two-player zerosum games. The exercises in this section are intended to review the concepts of
dominated strategies, equlibrium points, and the maximin/minimax strategies.
By working through your own examples, we hope to tie these concepts together
and ask some bigger questions about equilibrium points. For example, should
a player always play an equilibrium strategy? Will the maximin/minimax
strategy always find an equilibrium point if one exists? What should a player
do if no equlibrium exists? Although the formal answers to some of these
questions are outside the scope of this book, you should be able to make some
good conjectures about equilibrium points and rational solutions to two-player
zero-sum games.
Exercise 2.6.1 Random 2 × 2 matrix. Write down a random payoff (zerosum) matrix with two strategy choices for each player.
Exercise 2.6.2 Random 3 × 3 matrix. Write down a random payoff (zerosum) matrix with three strategy choices for each player.
Exercise 2.6.3 Random 4 × 4 matrix. Write down a random payoff (zerosum) matrix with four strategy choices for each player.
Exercise 2.6.4 Analyze several examples. Exchange your list of matrices
with another student in the class. For each matrix you have been given
a try to determine any dominated strategies, if they exist.
b try to determine any equilibrium points, if they exist.
c determine the maximin and minimax strategies for Player 1 and Player
2, respectively. Can you always find these?
Exercise 2.6.5 Classify examples. Now combine all the examples of payoff
matrices in a group of 3 or 4 students. Make a list of the examples with
equilibrium points and a list of examples without equilibrium points. If you
have only one list, try creating examples for the other list. Based on your lists,
do you think random payoff matrices are likely to have equilibrium points?
We want to use lists of matrices as experimental examples to try to answer
some of the remaining questions we have about finding rational solutions for
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games and equilibrium points. If you don’t feel you have enough examples,
you are welcome to create more or gather more from your classmates.
Exercise 2.6.6 Playing an equilibrium strategy. If a matrix has an equilibrium point, can a player ever do better to not play an equilibrium strategy?
Explain.
Exercise 2.6.7 Equilibia and maximin/minimax. If a matrix has an
equilibrium point, does the maximin/minimax strategy always find it? Explain.
Exercise 2.6.8 No equilibria and maximin/minimax. If a matrix does
NOT have an equilibrium point, should a player always play the maximin/
minimax strategy? Explain.
Exercise 2.6.9 Strategy and games with no equilibria. If a matrix
does NOT have an equilibrium point is there an ideal strategy for each player?
Explain.
Exercise 2.6.10 Summarize the connections. Write a brief summary of
the connections you have observed between finding a rational solution for a
game and equilibrium points.
Now you should have an understanding of how to find equilibrium strategies
in two-player zero-sum games. The main advantage of equilibrium strategies
is that if both players play them, neither player would have gained by playing
a different strategy. Thus, we can think of the equilibrium strategies as the
solution to the game for two rational players. But what should our players do
if the game has no equilibrium point? We will look more closely at games with
no equilibrium point in the next chapter.

2.7 Popular Culture: Rationality and Perfect Information
In this section, we will look at applications of rationality and perfect information in popular culture. We present films with connections to game theory and
suggest some related questions for essays or class discussion.
The movie Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
the Bomb (1964) depicts the cold war era with the USA and the Soviet Union
on the brink of atomic war.
Question 2.7.1 Society would generally consider General Jack Ripper to be
irrational. What is his goal or his optimal payoff? Give evidence that he is, in
fact, acting rationally in light of his goal.

Question 2.7.2 Explain how the Soviet’s Doomsday Machine is supposed
to be the ultimate deterrent to nuclear war. How does the lack of perfect
information impact the effectiveness of the Doomsday Machine?

In the movie The Princess Bride (1987) the Dread Pirate Roberts and
kidnapper Vizzini engage in a battle of wits in which Vizzini is to deduce
which goblet contain a lethal poison.
Question 2.7.3 In your own words describe how the poison scene demonstrates
that knowing that both players have the same knowledge can help one
deduce additional information. In other words, just knowing that one player
has all the information is not enough; that player, must also know that the
other player has the same knowledge.

Question 2.7.4 Of course, in the poison scene, both players break the rules.
How does this impact the players’ ability to use perfect information?
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Now try to apply the ideas of rationality and perfect information to your
own popular culture examples.
Question 2.7.5 Consider a game-theoretic scenario in a novel or film of your
choice. Are the players rational? What are the players’ goals, and are they
making choices which will maximize their payoff? Explain.

Question 2.7.6 Consider the statement “One of the main differences between
horror films and suspense films is that in horror films characters behave irrationally while in suspense films they behave rationally.” Do you agree or
disagree with this statement? Give an example of a suspense film and a horror
film with evidence from the films that supports your position.

Question 2.7.7 Think of other films where two characters engage in a “game.”
What are the assumptions of the players? Do they have have perfect information? Does the amount of information a player has give him or her an
advantage? Explain.

Question 2.7.8 Give an example from a film, current events, or your own life
where if one player “breaks the rules,” while the other player assumes perfect
knowledge (both players know the possible strategies and outcomes), it will
change the outcome of the “game.”


Chapter 3

Repeated Two-Person Zerosum Games

If we are presented with a two-person zero-sum game we know that our
first step is to look for an equilibrium point. If a game has an equilibrium
point, then we know that our players should play the corresponding strategy
pair. In this case the equilibrium pair and its payoff vector is the “solution” to
the game. In this chapter we will explore games that do not necessarily have
an equilibrium point. We will also try to determine what a player should do if
they play the game repeatedly.

3.1 Introduction to Repeated Games
Now that we are experts at finding equilibrium pairs, what happens when a
game doesn’t have any equilibrium pairs? What should our players do?
Example 3.1.1 A 2 × 2 Repeated Game. Consider the following zero-sum
game


1 0
.
−1 2
Does this game have an equilibrium pair? Play this game with an opponent
10 times. Tally your wins and losses. Describe how you chose which strategy
to play. Describe how your opponent chose which strategy to play.

When playing the game several times, does it make sense for either player
to play the same strategy all the time? Why or why not?
Although we use the term “strategy” to mean which row (or column) a
player chooses to play, we will also refer to how a player plays a repeated game
as the player’s strategy. In order to avoid confusion, in repeated games we will
define some specific strategies.

29
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Definition 3.1.2 In a repeated game, if a player always plays the same row
(or column), we say that she is playing a pure strategy.
♦
For example, if Player 1 always plays Row A, we say she is playing pure
strategy A.
Definition 3.1.3 If a player varies which row (or column) he plays, then we
say he is playing a mixed strategy.
♦
For example, if a player plays Row A 40% of the time and Row B 60% of
the time, we will say he is playing a (.4, .6) strategy, as we generally use the
probability rather than the percent. The probabilities of each strategy will be
listed in the same order as the strategies in the matrix.
It is not enough just to determine how often to play a strategy. Suppose
Player 1 just alternates rows in Example 3.1.1. Can Player 2 “out-guess” Player
1? What might be a better way for Player 1 to play?
We’d really like to find a way to determine the best mixed strategy for each
player in repeated games. Let’s start with what we already know: games with
equilibrium points. If a game has an equilibrium pair, would a player want
to play a mixed strategy? Recall that a strategy pair is an equilibrium pair if
neither player gains by switching strategy.
Example 3.1.4 Repeating a Game with an Equilibrium. Consider the
following zero-sum game


−1 1
.
0 2
This game has an equilibrium pair. Convince yourself that if this game is
played repeatedly, each player should choose to play a pure strategy.

Thus, if the game has an equilibrium we know that players will play the pure
strategies determined by the equilibrium pairs. So let’s get back to thinking
about games without equilibrium pairs. If we play such a game once, can we
predict the outcome? What about if we repeat the game several times– can
we predict the outcome? Think about tossing a coin. If you toss it once, can
you predict the outcome? What if you toss it 100 times– can you predict the
outcome? Not exactly, but we can say what we expect: if we toss a coin 100
times we expect to have half of the coins turn up heads and half turn up tails.
This may not be the actual outcome, but it is a reasonable prediction. Now is
a good time to remind yourself about finding the expected value!!
Recall the familiar game Rock-Paper-Scissors: ROCK beats SCISSORS,
SCISSORS beat PAPER, and PAPER beats ROCK. Using the payoff matrix
and experimentation, we will try to determine the best strategy for this game.
Exercise 3.1.5 RPS payoff matrix. Construct a game matrix for RockPaper-Scissors.
Exercise 3.1.6 RPS and equilibrium points. Is Rock-Paper-Scissors a
zero-sum game? Does it have an equilibrium point? Explain.
Exercise 3.1.7 Play RPS. We want to look at what happens if we repeat
Rock-Paper-Scissors. Play the game ten times with an opponent. Record the
results (list strategy pairs and payoffs for each player).
Exercise 3.1.8 Conjecture a strategy. Describe any strategy you used in
Exercise 3.1.7.
Exercise 3.1.9 Strengths and weaknesses of your strategy. Reflect on
your chosen strategy. Does it guarantee you a “win”? What should it mean
to “win” in a repeated game? What are the strengths and weaknesses of your
strategy?
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Exercise 3.1.10 Share your strategy. Discuss your strategy with someone
else in the class (it can be your opponent). After sharing your ideas for a
strategy, can you improve your previous strategy?
Although you may have come up with a good strategy, let’s see if we can’t
decide what the “best” strategy should be for Rock-Paper-Scissors. Let’s assume we are playing Rock-Paper-Scissors against the smartest player to ever
live. We will call such an opponent the “perfect” player.
Exercise 3.1.11 The weakness of a pure strategy. Explain why it is not
a good idea to play a pure strategy; i.e., to play only ROCK, only PAPER, or
only SCISSORS.
Exercise 3.1.12 An uneven strategy. Does it make sense to play one
option more often than another (for example, ROCK more often than PAPER)?
Explain.
Exercise 3.1.13 Frequency of R, P, S. How often should you play each
option?
Exercise 3.1.14 Playing a pattern. Do you want to play in a predictable
pattern or randomly? What are some advantages and disadvantages of a pattern? What are some advantages and disadvantages of a random strategy?
Hopefully, you concluded that the best strategy against our perfect player
would be to play ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS 1/3 of the time each, and to
play randomly. We can say that our strategy is to play each option randomly
with a probability of 1/3, and call this the Random(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) strategy.
Exercise 3.1.15 Long-term payoff. Using this “best” strategy, what do
you predict the long term payoff will be for Player 1? For Player 2?
Exercise 3.1.16 Testing the Random(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) strategy. Let’s
check our prediction. Using a die, let 1 and 2 represent ROCK, 3 and 4
represent PAPER, and 5 and 6 represent SCISSORS. Play the game 20 times
with someone in class where each player rolls to determine the choice of ROCK,
PAPER, or SCISSORS. Keep track of the strategy pairs and payoffs. What
was the total payoff for each player? (At this point, if you still feel that you
have a better strategy, try your strategy against the random one– see what
happens!)
Exercise 3.1.17 Compare to your prediction. How did the actual outcome compare to your predicted outcome? What do you expect would happen
if you play the game 100 times? (Or more?)
Using ideas about probability and expected value we can more precisely
answer Exercise 3.1.17.
Exercise 3.1.18 Probabiliies when both players play the random
strategy. Assume both players are using the Random(1/3, 1/3, 1/3) strategy.
List all the possible outcomes for a single game (recall the outcome is the strategy pair and the payoff, for example [R, P], (−1, 1)). What is the probability
that any particular pair of strategies will be played? Are the strategy pairs
equally likely?
Exercise 3.1.19 Expected value. Using the probabilities and payoffs from
Exercise 3.1.18 calculate the expected value of the game for each player.
Exercise 3.1.20 Strategy for the repeated 2 × 2 game. Now consider
the matrix from Example 3.1.1 above:


1 0
.
−1 2
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See if you can determine how often Player 1 should play each row, and how
often Player 2 should play each column. Try testing your proposed strategy
(you may be able to use a variation on the dice as we saw in Exercise 3.1.16).
Write up any conjectured strategies and the results from playing the game
with your strategy. Do you think you have come up with the best strategy?
Explain.
You may have had an idea about the best way to play Rock-Paper-Scissors
before working through this section, but how can we find solutions to other
games, such as the one in Exercise 3.1.20? We don’t want to just use a “guess
and check” method. Especially since there are infinitely many possible mixed
strategies to try! The rest of the chapter will develop mathematical methods
for solving repeated games with no equilibrium point.

3.2 Mixed Strategies: Graphical Solution
In this section we will learn a method for finding the maximin solution for a
repeated game using a graph.
Let’s continue to consider the game given in Example 3.1.1 by


1 0
.
−1 2
In order to make our analysis easier, let’s name the row and column strategies as in Table 3.2.1.
Table 3.2.1 Example 3.1.1 with named strategies.
A
B

C
1
-1

D
0
2

We want to determine how often Player 1 should play A and how often she
should play B.
Exercise 3.2.2 Conjecture a strategy. First it is good to test your instinct.
Do you think she should play one of the strategies more often than the other?
If so, which strategy should she play the most?
What we are really trying to find is the probability with which Player 1
plays A (or B). Since we know that the probabilities sum to one, if we can find
one probability, then we know the other.
Here is one way to do this. Let p be the probability that Player 1 plays B.
Let m be the payoff to Player 1. Since we are trying to find a mixed strategy
for Player 1, we will pick a strategy for Player 2 and try to determine the
possible payoffs for Player 1.
Let us determine some pairs (p, m).
Step 1. Assume Player 2 plays pure strategy C.
Step 1a. Find the probability (p) and payoff (m) if Player 1 always plays
A. If Player 1 plays pure strategy A, then she never plays B. Thus the
probability she plays B is 0. Hence, p = 0. In the case where Player 1
plays A and Player 2 plays C, what is the payoff to Player 1? This is m,
so m = 1. Thus, for the strategy pair [A, C] we get (0, 1) for (p, m). It
is important to note that (0, 1) is not a payoff vector. This is common
notation for any ordered pair. With payoff vectors, the ordered pair
represents the payoff to each player. Here the ordered pair represents a
probability of playing B and the payoff to Player 1.
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Step 1b. Find the probability (p) and payoff (m) if Player 1 always plays B.
If Player 1 plays pure strategy B, then what is the probability that she
plays B? Since she always plays B, p = 1. In the case where Player 1
plays B and Player 2 plays C, what is the payoff to Player 1? m = −1.
Thus, for the strategy pair [B, C] we get (1, −1) for (p, m).
Step 1c. Now we want to know what Player 1’s payoff will be as she varies
the probability, p, with which she plays B. We can draw a graph where
the x-axis represents to probability with which she plays B (p) and the
y-axis represents the expected payoff (m). See Figure 3.2.3.

1

A

B

Figure 3.2.3 Labeled axes.
Thus, when Player 1 plays only A, she is playing B with probability 0;
when Player 1 plays only B, she is playing B with probability 1. It might
be easier to remember if you label your graph as in Figure 3.2.3.
Step 1d. Now we can plot the points we determined in Step 1a and Step 1b.
We will connect them with a line representing Player 2’s pure strategy
C. See Figure 3.2.4.
2
(0, 1)
1

1
C
−1
A

(1, −1)
B

Figure 3.2.4 Player 2’s strategy C.
Before moving on, let’s make sure we understand what this line represents.
Any point on it represents the expected payoff to Player 1 as she varies her
strategy, assuming Player 2 only plays C. In this case, we can see that as she
plays B more often, her expected payoff goes down.
Now let’s do the same thing, assuming Player 2 plays only D.
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Step 2. Assume Player 2 plays pure strategy D.
Step 2a. Find the probability (p) and payoff (m) if Player 1 always plays A.
If Player 1 plays pure strategy A, then what is the probability that she
plays B? p = 0. What is the payoff to Player 1? m = 0. Thus, for the
strategy pair [A, D] we get (0, 0) for (p, m).
Step 2b. Find the probability (p) and payoff (m) if Player 1 always plays B.
If Player 1 plays pure strategy B, then what is the probability that she
plays B? p = 1. What is the payoff to Player 1? m = 2. Thus, for the
strategy pair [B, D] we get (1, 2) for (p, m).
Step 2c. Now, on our same graph from Step 1, we can plot the points we
determined in Step 2a and Step 2b. We will connect them with a line
representing Player 2’s pure strategy D. See Figure 3.2.5.
(1, 2)
2
(0, 1)
1

D

(0, 0)
1
C
−1
A

(1, −1)
B

Figure 3.2.5 Player 2’s strategy D.
Now we can see that if Player 2 plays only D, then Player 1 does best by
playing only B.
So we have this nice graph, but what does it really tell us? Although we drew
lines representing each of Player 2’s pure strategies, Player 1 doesn’t know
what Player 2 will do. Suppose Player 1 only played A, while Player 2 plays
an unknown mixed strategy. Then the possible payoffs for Player 1 are 1 or
0. The more often Player 2 plays C, the more often Player 1 gets 1. So the
expected payoff per game for a repeated game varies between 0 and 1. We can
see the possible expected values as the red line on the graph in Figure 3.2.6.
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(1, 2)
2
(0, 1)
1

D

(0, 0)
1
C

(1, −1)

−1
A

B

Figure 3.2.6 Figure 3.2.6 of the expected payoffs for Player 1 playing only A.
Since we want to understand mixed strategies for Player 1, what would
happen if Player 1 played A half the time and B half the time? In other words,
what happens if p = 1/2? Although we may not easily be able to see the
exact values, we can represent the possible expected values on the graph in
Figure 3.2.7.

(1, 2)
2
(0, 1)
1

D

(0, 0)
1
C
−1
A

(1, −1)
B

Figure 3.2.7 The expected payoffs for Player 1 playing B half the time.
Hopefully, you’ve begun to see that for each choice of p, the top line represents the highest expected value for Player 1; the bottom line represents the
lowest expected value for Player 1; the area between the lines represents the
possible expected values for Player 1. As we did with non-repeated games, let’s
look at the “worst case scenario” for Player 1. In other words, let’s assume
that Player 2 can figure out Player 1’s strategy. Then Player 1 would want
to maximize the minimum expected value. Aha! This is just looking for the
maximin strategy!
Now the minimum expected value for each choice of p is given by the bottom
lines on the graph, shown in red in Figure 3.2.8.
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(1, 2)
2
(0, 1)
1

D

(0, 0)
1
C
−1
A

(1, −1)
B

Figure 3.2.8 The minimum expected payoffs for Player 1.
It should be easy to see that the maximum of the minimum expected payoffs
occurs at the intersection of the two lines.
Step 3. Find the intersection of the two lines.
Step 3a. Find the equation for Line C. This is the line passing through the
points (0, 1) and (1, −1). It has slope −2 and y-intercept 1. Thus, it
has equation y = −2x + 1. [Although the x-axis represents probability
p and the y-axis represents expected payoff m, you are probably more
comfortable solving equations–at least for the moment–in x and y.]
Step 3b. Find the equation for Line D. This is the line passing through the
points (0, 0) and (1, 2). It has slope 2 and y-intercept 0. Thus, it has
equation y = 2x.
Step 3c. Use substitution to find the point of intersection.
2x =

−2x + 1

4x =

1
1
4

x=

Substituting x = 41 back in to either original equation, say y = 2x, gives
us y = 12 . Thus, the point of intersection is (1/4, 1/2).
Step 4. Determine Player 1’s maximin mixed strategy. Recalling that the
first coordinate is p, the probability that Player 1 plays B, we know
that Player 1 will play B with probability 1/4, and thus, play A with
probability 3/4 [1 − 1/4 = 3/4]. The expected payoff for Player 1 is 1/2.
It is important to check back to your original intuition about the game
from Exercise 3.2.2. Did it seem as though Player 1 should play A more
often than B?
Let’s make a few important observations. First, it should be clear from the
graph that Player 1 expects a payoff of 1/2 NO MATTER WHAT PLAYER
2 DOES. Furthermore, since this is a zero-sum game, we know that Player 2’s
expected payoff is −1/2. It is important to note that this graph does not give
us any information about an optimal strategy for Player 2. We will see how to
find a strategy for Player 2 in the following exercises. Can you think of how
you might do this?
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We can use the graphical method to find the maximin and minimax mixed
strategies for repeated two-person zero-sum games.
Using the same game matrix as above:


1 0
,
−1 2
we will continue to label Player 1’s strategies by A and B, and Player 2’s
strategies by C and D. We now want to determine the minimax strategy for
Player 2. Keep in mind the payoffs are still the payoffs to Player 1, so Player
2 wants the payoff to be as small as possible.
Exercise 3.2.9 Sketch the graph. Sketch the graph for Player 1 that we
drew above. Be sure to label the endpoints of each line. Also label each line
according to which strategy they represent.
Exercise 3.2.10 Indicate the minimax strategy. Describe the minimax
strategy and show it on the graph. (You do not need to find the actual mixed
strategy for Player 2.)
Exercise 3.2.11 Payoff vectors. Are the payoff vectors for the maximin
and minimax strategies the same?
For non-repeated games we have seen that if the maximin value is the same
as the minimax value, then the game has a pure strategy equilibrium. The same
idea applies to mixed strategy games. If the value of the maximin strategy is
the same as the value of the minimax strategy, then the corresponding mixed
strategies will be an equilibrium point. Thus, your answer to Exercise 3.2.11
should tell you this game has a mixed strategy equilibrium point consisting of
the maximin/ minimax strategy.
We now know that Player 2 wants to play the minimax strategy in response
to Player 1’s maximin strategy, so we need to find the actual mixed strategy
for Player 2 to employ. Since we are minimizing Player 1’s maximum expected
payoff, we will continue to use the matrix representing Player 1’s payoff. We
will repeat the process we used for Player 1, except the x-axis now represents
the probability that Player 2 will play D, and the lines will represent Player
1’s strategies A and B. The y-axis continues to represent Player 1’s payoff.
Exercise 3.2.12 Draw the axes for Player 2’s strategy. First sketch the
axes. (Recall, the x-axis only goes from 0 to 1.)
Exercise 3.2.13 Player 1 plays A. Assume Player 1 only plays A.
a If Player 2 only plays C, what is the payoff to Player 1? Recall we called
this m. What is the probability that Player 2 plays D? Recall we called
this p. On your graph, plot the point (p, m).
b If Player 2 plays only D, find m and p. Plot (p, m) on the graph.
c Now sketch the line through your two points. This line represents Player
1’s pure strategy A and the expected payoff (to Player 1) for Player 2’s
mixed strategies. Label it A.
Exercise 3.2.14 Player 1 plays B. Now assume Player 1 plays only B.
Repeat the steps in Exercise 3.2.13, using B instead of A, to find the line
representing Player 1’s pure strategy B. (Label it!)
Exercise 3.2.15 The graph for Player 2. It is important to keep in mind
that although the x-axis refers to how often Player 2 will play C and D, the
y-axis represents the payoff to Player 1.
a Explain why we are looking for the minimax strategy for Player 2.
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b Show on the graph the maximum payoff that Player 1 can expect for each
of Player 2’s possible mixed strategies.
c Show the point on the graph that represents the minimax strategy.
Exercise 3.2.16 Equations for the lines. Find the equations of the lines
you drew in Exercise 3.2.13 and Exercise 3.2.14.
Exercise 3.2.17 The point of intersection. Using the equations from
Exercise 3.2.16, find the point of intersection of the two lines.
Exercise 3.2.18 Player 2’s mixed strategy. How often should Player 2
play C? How often should he play D? What is Player 1’s expected payoff?
And hence, what is Player 2’s expected payoff?
Exercise 3.2.19 Equilibrium strategies. Explain why each player should
play the maximin/ minimax mixed strategy. In other words, explain why
neither player benefits by changing his or her strategy.
Hint. Think about playing defensively and assuming the other player is the
“perfect” player.
Now it may have occurred to you that since this is a zero-sum game, we
could have just converted our matrix to the payoff matrix for Player 2, and
found Player 2’s maximin strategy. But it is important to understand the
relationship between the maximin and the minimax strategies. So for the sake
of practice and a little more insight, find Player 2’s maximin strategy by writing
the payoff matrix for Player 2 and repeating the process that we did for Player
1. Keep in mind that Player 2 is finding the probability of playing C and D
rather than A and B.
Exercise 3.2.20 Finding the maximin using Player 2’s payoffs. Convert the payoff matrix above into the payoff matrix for Player 2. Find the
maximin strategy for Player 2 using the graphical method. Be sure to include
a sketch of the graph (labeled!!), the equations for the lines, the probability
that Player 2 will play C and D, and the expected payoff for Player 2.
Exercise 3.2.21 Compare the solutions. Compare your answer in Exercise 3.2.20 to your answer in Exercise 3.2.18.
Exercise 3.2.22 Fairness. Is this game fair? Explain.
Exercise 3.2.23 Expected payoff. We saw above that the expected payoff
for Player 1 was 1/2. Explain what this means for a repeated game.
Hint. Is it actually possible for a player to win 1/2 in a given game?
Now you are ready to try to analyze some more games!
Exercise 3.2.24
Practice
finding mixed strategies. Consider the zero

−4 4
sum game
.
2 −2
a Does this game have a pure strategy equilibrium?
b Just by looking at the matrix, do you think this game will be fair? (Would
you rather be Player 1 or Player 2?)
c Sketch (and label!) the appropriate graph for this game.
d Use you graph to determine if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium point.
If there is, how often should Player 1 play each strategy? What is the
expected payoff to each player?
e Is this game fair? Explain. Compare your answer to (b).
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Exercise 3.2.25
 More practice finding mixed strategies. Consider the
0
1
zero-sum game
.
1 −10
a Does this game have a pure strategy equilibrium?
b Just by looking at the matrix, do you think this game will be fair? (Would
you rather be Player 1 or Player 2?)
c Sketch (and label!) the appropriate graph for this game.
d Use you graph to determine if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium point.
If there is, how often should Player 1 play each strategy? What is the
expected payoff to each player?
e Is this game fair? Explain. Compare your answer to (b).
Although it is worth working through examples by hand in order to understand the algebraic process, in the next section we will see how technology can
help us solve systems of equations.

3.3 Using Sage to Graph Lines and Solve Equations
In this section we will use technology to graph lines and solve for the intersection point. In particular, we will use an open online resource called Sage.
Let’s continue to consider the game given in Table 3.2.1 by
Table 3.3.1 Game from Example 3.1.1.
A
B

C
1
-1

D
0
2

Recall, our goal is to determine how often Player 1 should play A and how
often she should play B.
We will follow the same steps as in Section 3.2. Let p be the probability
that Player 1 plays B. Let m be the payoff to Player 1. Since we are trying to
find a mixed strategy for Player 1, we will pick a strategy for Player 2 and try
to determine the possible payoffs for Player 1.
Let us determine some pairs (p, m).
Step 1. Assume Player 2 plays pure strategy C.
Step 1a. If Player 1 always plays A, then we are considering the strategy pair
[A, C]. Since Player 1 never plays B, p = 0. The payoff to Player 1 for
[A, C] is m = 1. Thus, for the strategy pair [A, C] we get (p, m) = (0, 1).
Step 1b. If Player 1 always plays B, then we are considering the strategy pair
[B, C]. Since Player 1 always plays B, p = 1. The payoff to Player 1
for [A, C] is m = −1. Thus, for the strategy pair [B, C] we get (p, m) =
(1, −1).
Step 1c. Now we want to know what Player 1’s payoff will be as she varies
the probability, p, with which she plays B. We can draw a graph where
the x-axis represents to probability with which she plays B (p) and the
y-axis represents the expected payoff (m). Thus, when Player 1 plays
only A, she is playing B with probability 0; when Player 1 plays only B,
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she is playing B with probability 1. It might be easier to remember if
you label your graph as in Figure 3.2.3.
Step 1d. Now we can use Sage to plot the points we determined in Step 1a
and Step 1b and the line between them. This line represents Player 2’s
pure strategy C. See Figure 3.2.4. Click on the “Evaluate (Sage)” button
to plot the line between the points (0, 1) and (1, −1).
u =(0 ,1) ;
v =(1 , -1) ;
show ( line ([u , v], thickness =2 , color =( ' blue '))+ point (u ,
color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70) + point (v ,
color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70) , figsize =4)

Before moving on, let’s again, make sure we understand what this line represents. Any point on it represents the expected payoff to Player 1 as she varies
her strategy, assuming Player 2 only plays C. In this case, we can see that as
she plays B more often, her expected payoff goes down. You can now use this
Sage cell to plot any line for Player 2’s pure strategy C. Just edit the values
for the points u and v. Go ahead and try it! (Don’t worry the original values
will reset when you refresh the page.)
Now let’s do the same thing, assuming Player 2 plays only D.
Step 2. Assume Player 2 plays pure strategy D.
Step 2a. If Player 1 always plays A, then we are considering the strategy pair
[A, D]. Since Player 1 never plays B, p = 0. The payoff to Player 1 for
[A, D] is m = 0. Thus, for the strategy pair [A, D] we get (p, m) = (0, 0).
Step 2b. If Player 1 always plays B, then we are considering the strategy pair
[B, D]. Since Player 1 always plays B, p = 1. The payoff to Player 1 for
[B, D] is m = 2. Thus, for the strategy pair [B, D] we get (p, m) = (1, 2).
Step 2c. Now, on our same graph from Step 1, we can plot the points we
determined in Step 2a and Step 2b. We will connect them with a line
representing Player 2’s pure strategy D. See Figure 3.2.5.
u =(0 ,1) ;
v =(1 , -1) ;
w =(0 ,0) ;
z =(1 , 2) ;
show ( line ([u , v], thickness =2 , color =( ' blue '))+ point (u ,
color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70)
+ point (v , color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70)
+ line ([w , z], thickness =2 , color =( ' red '))
+ point (w , color =( ' red ') , pointsize =70) + point (z ,
color =( ' red ') , pointsize =70) , figsize =4)

Now we can see that if Player 2 plays only D, then Player 1 does best by
playing only B. Again, you can use this Sage cell to plot both Player 2’s
pure strategies. Points u and v are for strategy C, while points w and z
are for strategy D.
As we saw in Section 3.2, for each choice of p, the top line represents the
highest expected value for Player 1; the bottom line represents the lowest
expected value for Player 1; the area between the lines represents the possible
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expected values for Player 1. Thus, Player 1 wants to maximize the minimum
expected value, which means she wants to find the maximin strategy. And, as
we saw in Section 3.2, the maximin strategy occurs at the intersection of the
two lines.
Step 3. Find the intersection of the two lines.
Step 3a. Find the equation for Line C. This is the line passing through the
points (0, 1) and (1, −1). It has slope −2 and y-intercept 1. Thus, it has
equation m = −2p + 1. (Recall the x-axis represents probability p and
the y-axis represents expected payoff m.)
Step 3b. Find the equation for Line D. This is the line passing through the
points (0, 0) and (1, 2). It has slope 2 and y-intercept 0. Thus, it has
equation m = 2p.
Step 3c. Now we can use technology to help us solve the equations.
p , m = var ( 'p ,␣m ')
solve ([ m == -2* p +1 , m ==2* p], p , m) [0]
[p == (1/4) , m == (1/2) ]

The solution for Player 1 is (p, m). Where p is the probability Player 1
plays B, and m is the expected payoff to Player 1.
We can use this Sage cell to solve for p and m for any 2 × 2 game by
editing the equations m == −2 ∗ p + 1, m == 2 ∗ p.
Step 4. Determine Player 1’s maximin mixed strategy. Recalling that p is
the probability that Player 1 plays B, we know that Player 1 will play
B with probability 1/4, and thus, play A with probability 3/4. The
expected payoff for Player 1, m, is 1/2. It is important to check the algebraic solution with where the intersection point appears on the graph.
Although we are using technology to help us graph and solve for the intersection point, we need to be able to catch any errors we make entering
the information into Sage.
We have seen that we can use the same matrix with Player 1’s payoffs to find
the strategy for Player 2. Using the same game matrix as above:


1 0
,
−1 2
and continuing to label Player 1’s strategies by A and B, and Player 2’s strategies by C and D, we can graph lines for Player 1’s pure strategies A and B.
We now let the x--axis represent the probability that Player 2 plays D. In
the Sage applet below, for u and v enter the coordinates of two points that
determine the line for when Player 1 plays A, then the two points for w and
z that determine the line for when Player 1 plays B. We will then have Sage
graph the lines. You can enter new values for u, v, w, z if you would like to
draw the graph for a different matrix.
@interact ( layout = dict ( top =[[ 'u ' , 'v '] ,[ 'w ' , 'z ' ]]) )
def endpoints (u= vector ((0 ,1.0) ) , v= vector ((1 ,0.0) ) ,
w= vector ((0 , -1.0) ) , z= vector ((1 , 2.0) )):
L1 = line ([u , v], thickness =2 , color =( ' blue '))
L2 = line ([w , z], thickness =2 , color =( ' red '))
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P1 = point (u , color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70)
P2 = point (v , color =( ' blue ') , pointsize =70)
P3 = point (w , color =( ' red ') , pointsize =70)
P4 = point (z , color =( ' red ') , pointsize =70)
pretty_print ( html (" Enter ␣ the ␣ coordinates ␣ of ␣ the ␣ endpoints ␣
for ␣ the ␣ two ␣ lines ␣ you 'd␣ like ␣ to ␣ graph .␣ Note ␣ that ␣u␣ and ␣
v␣ are ␣ for ␣ one ␣ line ,␣w␣ and ␣z␣ for ␣ the ␣ other ."))
show ( L1 + L2 + P1 + P2 + P3 +P4 , figsize =4)

Now determine and enter the equations of the two lines and have Sage solve
for the intersection point.
p , m = var ( 'p ,␣m ')
@interact
def
intersection ( Slope1 = -1 , Intercept1 =1 , Slope2 =3 , Intercept2 = -1) :
Eq1 = m == Slope1 *p+ Intercept1
Eq2 = m == Slope2 *p+ Intercept2
S = solve ([ Eq1 , Eq2 ], p , m) [0]
pretty_print ( html (" The ␣ intersection ␣ point ␣ is ␣$%s$ ,␣
$% s$ ." %( latex (S [0]) , latex (S [1]) )))

You can now use these last two Sage cells to solve any 2 × 2 game with a
mixed strategy equilibrium. You can also take some time to experiment with
what happens if the game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
Now use the Sage cells to help you analyze some more games!
Exercise 3.3.2 Use Sage
 to find
 a mixed strategy equilibrium. Con−4 4
sider the zero-sum game
.
2 −2
a Does this game have a pure strategy equilibrium?
b Just by looking at the matrix, do you think this game will be fair? (Would
you rather be Player 1 or Player 2?)
c Use Sage to draw the appropriate graph for this game. Which pure
strategy does the blue line represent? Which pure strategy does the red
line represent?
d Use your graph to determine if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium
point. If there is, use Sage to determine how often Player 1 should play
each strategy. What is the expected payoff to each player?
e Is this game fair? Explain. Compare your answer to (b).
Exercise 3.3.3 More practice with Sage. Consider the zero-sum game

0
1
.
1 −10
a Does this game have a pure strategy equilibrium?
b Just by looking at the matrix, do you think this game will be fair? (Would
you rather be Player 1 or Player 2?)
c Use Sage to draw the appropriate graph for this game. Which pure
strategy does the blue line represent? Which pure strategy does the red
line represent?
d Use your graph to determine if there is a mixed strategy equilibrium
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point. If there is, use Sage to determine how often Player 1 should play
each strategy. What is the expected payoff to each player?
e Is this game fair? Explain. Compare your answer to (b).

3.4 Mixed Strategies: Expected Value Solution
In this section, we will use the idea of expected value to find the equilibrium
mixed strategies for repeated two-person zero-sum games.
One of the significant drawbacks of the graphical solution from the previous
sections is that it can only solve 2 X 2 matrix games. If each player has
3 options, we would need to graph in three dimensions. Technically this is
possible, but rather complicated. If each player has more than 3 options, since
we can’t graph in four or more dimensions, we are at a complete loss. So
we need to think about an alternate way to solve for the mixed strategies.
Although we will begin with 2 X 2 games, this method will easily generalize
to larger games.
Example 3.4.1 Matching Pennies Game. Consider the game in which
each player can choose HEADS (H) or TAILS (T); if the two players match,
Player 1 wins; if the two players differ, Player 2 wins. What strategy should
each player play?

Exercise 3.4.2 Payoff matrix. Determine the payoff matrix for the Matching Pennies game.
Exercise 3.4.3 Pure strategy equilibria. Explain why the Matching
Pennies game has no pure strategy equilibrium point.
Exercise 3.4.4 Conjecture a mixed strategy. Since we know that there
is no pure strategy equilibrium point, we need to look for a mixed strategy
equilibrium point. Just by looking at the payoff matrix for Matching Pennies,
what do you think an ideal strategy for each player would be? Explain your
choice.
Exercise 3.4.5 Expected value of conjecture. Suppose both players play
your ideal strategy in the Matching Pennies game, what should the expected
value of the game be?
We could use our previous graphical method to determine the expected
value of the game (you might quickly try this just to verify your prediction).
However, as we have noted, a major drawback of the graphical solution is
that if our players have 3 (or more) options, then we would need to graph an
equation in 3 (or more!) variables; which, I hope you agree, we don’t want to
do. Although we will continue to focus on 2 × 2 games, we will develop a new
method which can more easily be used to solve to larger games.
We will need a little notation. Let
P1 (H) = the probability that Player 1 plays H;
P1 (T ) = the probability that Player 1 plays T;
P2 (H) = the probability that Player 2 plays H;
P2 (T ) = the probability that Player 2 plays T.
Also, we will let E1 (H) be the expected value for Player 1 playing pure strategy
H against a given strategy for Player 2. Similarly, E2 (H) will be Player 2’s
expected value for playing pure strategy H.
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Exercise 3.4.6 The (60, 40) strategy for Player 2. Suppose Player 2 plays
H 60% of the time and T 40% of the time.
a What are P2 (H) and P2 (T )?
b What do you think Player 1 should do? Does this differ from your ideal
mixed strategy in Exercise 3.4.4? Explain.
c We can use expected value to compute what Player 1 should do in response to Player 2’s 60/40 strategy. First, consider a pure strategy for
Player 1. Compute the expected value for Player 1 if she only plays H
while Player 2 plays H with probability .6 and T with probability .4. This
expected value is E1 (H), above.
d Similarly, compute the expected value for Player 1 if she plays only T
(call it E1 (T )).
e Which pure strategy has a higher expected value for Player 1? If Player
1 plays this pure strategy, will she do better than your predicted value
of the game?
Exercise 3.4.7 The (60, 40) strategy is not ideal for Player 2. Hopefully,
you concluded that in Exercise 3.4.6 a pure strategy is good for Player 1.
Explain why this means the 60/40 strategy is bad for Player 2.
Exercise 3.4.8 When to play H. For any particular mixed (or pure) strategy of Player 2, we could find E1 (T ) and E1 (H). Explain why if E1 (H) >
E1 (T ), Player 1 should always play H.
Exercise 3.4.9 When to play T. Similarly, explain why if E1 (H) < E1 (T ),
Player 1 should always play T.
Exercise 3.4.10 Player 2 is unhappy when Player 1’s expected values
are unequal. Explain why the situations in Exercise 3.4.8 and Exercise 3.4.9
are bad for Player 2.
Exercise 3.4.11 Equal expected values are better. Use your answers
from Exercise 3.4.8, Exercise 3.4.9, and Exercise 3.4.10 to explain why the
situation in which E1 (H) = E1 (T ) is the best for Player 2.
From Exercise 3.4.11 we now know that Player 2 wants E1 (H) = E1 (T ),
we can use a little algebra to compute the best defensive strategy for Player 2.
Remember, we want to assume that Player 1 will always be able to chose the
strategy that will be best for her, and thus Player 2 wants to protect himself.
Let’s find the probabilities with which Player 2 should play H and T.
Exercise 3.4.12 Equations for Player 1’s expected values. Let P2 (H)
and P2 (T ) be the probabilities that Player 2 plays H and T respectively. Find
equations for E1 (H) and E1 (T ) in terms of P2 (H) and P2 (T ) for the game
of Matching Pennies. Since we want E1 (H) = E1 (T ), set your two equations
equal to each other. This gives you one equation in terms of P2 (H) and P2 (T ).
Exercise 3.4.13 The sum equation. Explain why we must also have
P2 (H) + P2 (T ) = 1.
So in general, to solve for Player 2’s strategy, we want to write an equation
for each of Player 1’s pure strategy expected values in terms of Player 2’s
probabilities. For example, E1 (H) and E1 (T ) in terms of variables P2 (H) and
P2 (T ). We then set the expected values equal to each other. We now have an
equation just in terms of Player 2’s probabilities.
In order to solve for the probabilities, we also need to use the fact that
Player 2’s probabilities sum to 1. For example, P2 (H) + P2 (T ) = 1. For a 2 × 2
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game, you now have 2 equations with 2 unknowns (P2 (H) and P2 (T )). Use
an algebraic method such as substitution or elimination to solve the system of
equations.
Exercise 3.4.14 Solve for Player 2’s probabilities. Using the equations
from Exercise 3.4.12 and Exercise 3.4.13, solve for P2 (H) and P2 (T ). You now
have the equilibrium mixed strategy for Player 2. Does this match the mixed
strategy you determined in Exercise 3.4.4?
Now can you use a similar process to find Player 1’s strategy? Whose
expected values should you use? Whose probabliities?
Exercise 3.4.15 Find Player 1’s probabilities. Set up and solve the
analogous equations from Exercise 3.4.12 and Exercise 3.4.13 for Player 1.
Does this match the mixed strategy from Exercise 3.4.4?
Hint. We should have an equation for E2 (H) and one for E2 (T ). Since we
are looking for the probabilities of each of Player 1’s options, the equations
should involve P1 (H) and P1 (T ).
We now have a new method for finding the best mixed strategies for Players
1 and 2, assuming that each player is playing defensively against an ideal player.
But how can we find the value of the game? For Player 2, we assumed E1 (H) =
E1 (T ). In other words, we found the situation in which Player 1’s expected
value is the same no matter which pure strategy she plays. Thus, Player 1 is
indifferent to which pure strategy she plays. If she were not indifferent, then
she would play the strategy with a higher expected value. But, as we saw, this
would be bad for Player 2. So Player 1 can assume that Player 2 will play the
equilibrium mixed strategy. Thus, as long as Player 1 plays a mixed strategy,
it doesn’t matter whether at any given time, she plays H or T (this is the idea
that she is indifferent to them). Hence, the expected value of the game for
Player 1 is the same as E1 (H), which is the same as E1 (T ). Similarly, we find
that the expected value of the game for Player 2 is E2 (H) (or E2 (T )). This is
a pretty complicated idea. You may need to think about it for a while. In the
meantime, use the probabilities you found for each player and the equations
for E1 (H) and E2 (H) to find the value of the game for each player.
Exercise 3.4.16 Find Player 1’s expected value of the game. Use
the probabilities you calculated in Exercise 3.4.14 to find E1 (H), and hence
the expected value of the game for Player 1. How does this compare to your
prediction for the value of the game that you gave in Exercise 3.4.5?
Exercise 3.4.17 Find Player 2’s expected value of the game. Use
the probabilities you calculated in Exercise 3.4.15 to find E2 (H), and hence
the expected value of the game for Player 2. How does this compare to your
prediction for the value of the game that you gave in Exercise 3.4.5?
Keep practicing with the expected value method on some other games!
Exercise 3.4.18 Solve a 2 × 2 repeated game using expected values.
Apply this method of using expected value to Example 3.1.1 (which we solved
using the graphical method in the previous section) to find the equilibrium
mixed strategies for each player and the value of the game for each player:


1 0
.
−1 2
Exercise 3.4.19 Expected value solution for Rock-Paper-Scissors. As
we noted in this section, this method can be used to solve bigger games. We just
have more equations. Use the expected value method to find the equilibrium
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mixed strategy for Rock-Paper-Scissors for Player 2.
Hint. You will need to set E1 (R) = E1 (P ) and E1 (P ) = E1 (S); solve for
P2 (R), P2 (P ), P2 (S); etc. It should be very similar to what you did for Matching Pennies, but there will be three equations and three unknowns.
If you found this last exercise to be algebraically arduous, don’t worry,
we will eventually use technology to help us solve problems with several variables.

3.5 Liar’s Poker
In this section, we will continue to explore the ideas of a mixed strategy equilibrium. We have seen several examples of finding an equilibrium. We began
with games which had a pure strategy equilibrium and then moved to games
with mixed strategy equilibrium. We saw two different methods for finding an
equilibrium. The first employed graphs in order to understand and find the
maximin and minimax strategies, and hence the equilibrium mixed strategy.
The second method employed the ideas of expected value to find the equilibrium strategy. We will continue to solidify these ideas with another game, a
simplified variation of poker.
Example 3.5.1 Liar’s Poker. We begin with a deck of cards which has 50%
aces (A) and 50% kings (K). Aces rank higher than kings. Player 1 is dealt one
card, face down. Player 1 can look at the card, but does not show the card to
Player 2. Player 1 then says “ace” or “king” depending on what his card is.
Player 1 can either tell the truth and say what the card is (T), or he can bluff
and say that he has a higher ranking card (B). Note that if Player 1 has an
ace, he must tell the truth since there are no higher ranking cards. However,
if he is dealt a king, he can bluff, by saying he has an ace. If Player 1 says
“king” the game ends and both players break even. If Player 1 says “ace” then
Player 2 can either call (C) or fold (F). If Player 2 folds, then Player 1 wins
$0.50. If Player 2 calls and Player 1 does not have an ace, then Player 2 wins
$1. If Player 2 calls and Player 1 does have an ace, then Player 1 wins $1. 
Exercise 3.5.2 Play Liar’s Poker. Choose an opponent and play Liar’s
Poker several times. Be sure to play the game as Player 1 and as Player 2.
This is important for understanding the game. Keep track of the outcomes.
Exercise 3.5.3 Conjecture a strategy. Just from playing Liar’s Poker
several times, can you suggest a strategy for Player 1? What about for Player
2? Does this game seem fair, or does one of the players seem to have an
advantage? Explain your answers.
Exercise 3.5.4 Try to find the payoff matrix. In order to formally analyze
Liar’s Poker, we should find the payoff matrix. Do your best to find the payoff
matrix. In a single hand of Liar’s Poker, what are the possible strategies for
Player 1? What are the possible strategies for Player 2? Determine any payoffs
that you can.
Finding the payoff matrix in Exercise 3.5.4 is probably more challenging
than it appears. Eventually we want to employ the same method for finding
the payoff matrix that we used in One-Card Stud Poker from Example 2.4.1
in Chapter 2, but first we need to understand each player’s strategies, and the
resulting payoffs. We begin with the fact that Player 1 can be dealt an ace or
a king.
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Exercise 3.5.5 Player 1 has an Ace. Assume Player 1 is dealt an ace.
What can Player 1 do? What can Player 2 do? What is the payoff for each
situation?
Exercise 3.5.6 Player 1 has a King. Assume Player 1 is dealt a king.
What can Player 1 do? What can Player 2 do? What is the payoff for each
situation?
Since Player 1 must say “ace” when dealt an ace, he only has a choice
of strategy when dealt a king. So we can define his strategy independent of
the deal. One strategy is to say “ace” when dealt an ace and say “ace” when
dealt a king; call this the bluffing strategy (B). The other strategy is to say
“ace” when dealt an ace and say “king” when dealt a king; call this the truth
strategy (T). Recall that the only time Player 2 has a choice is when Player
1 says “ace.” In this case Player 2 can call (C) or fold (F). Since we need to
determine the payoff matrix, we first need to determine the payoffs for pure
strategies. This is similar to what we did for the One-Card Stud game.
Exercise 3.5.7 Expected value of [B, C]. Consider Player 1’s pure strategy
of always bluffing when dealt a king (B) and Player 2’s pure strategy of always
calling (C). Determine the expected value for Player 1. What is Player 2’s
expected value?
Hint.

You need to consider each possible deal.

Exercise 3.5.8 Expected value of [B, F]. Similarly, determine the expected
value for Player 1 for the pure strategy pair [B, F]. What is Player 2’s expected
value?
Exercise 3.5.9 Expected value of [T, C]. Determine the expected value
for Player 1 for the pure strategy pair [T, C]. What is Player 2’s expected
value?
Exercise 3.5.10 Expected value of [T, F]. Determine the expected value
for Player 1 for the pure strategy pair [T, F]. What is Player 2’s expected
value?
Exercise 3.5.11 Payoff matrix for Liar’s Poker. Using the expected
values you calculated in Exercise 3.5.7, Exercise 3.5.8, Exercise 3.5.9, and Exercise 3.5.10, set up the 2 × 2 payoff matrix for Liar’s Poker.
Once you have determined the payoff matrix for Liar’s Poker, you can
use either the graphical method or expected value method to solve the game.
But before using either of these methods always check for a pure strategy
equilibrium!
Exercise 3.5.12 Pure strategy equilibrium. Using the payoff matrix you
found in Exercise 3.5.11, does Liar’s Poker have a pure strategy equilibrium?
Explain.
Exercise 3.5.13 Mixed strategy equilibrium. Use any method you have
learned to find a mixed strategy equilibrium for Liar’s Poker. Give the mixed
strategy for Player 1 and the mixed strategy for Player 2.
Exercise 3.5.14 Compare strategies. Compare your solution from Exercise 3.5.13 to your conjectured strategy from Exercise 3.5.3.
Exercise 3.5.15 Expected value of the game. What is the expected
value of the game for each player? How much would Player 1 expect to win if
she played 15 games using the equilibrium mixed strategy?
Exercise 3.5.16 Fairness. Is this game fair? Explain. Again, compare your
answer to your conjecture in Exercise 3.5.3.
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Congratualtions! You can now set up matrices for simple games of chance
and solve for a mixed strategy equilibrium. Before solving a more complicated
game, let’s get the help of technology for solving larger matrix games.

3.6 Augmented Matrices
In this section, we will see how to use matrices to solve systems of equations.
In both the graphical method and the expected value method, you have had
to solve a system of equations. In the graphical method you had systems
consisting of two lines such as Example 3.6.1.
Example 3.6.1 Two Equations. An example of a system of two lines:
3
1
x−
5
5
y = −x + 3.
y=


In the expected value method we had systems of three equations such as
Example 3.6.2.
Example 3.6.2 Three Equations. An example of a system of three equations where the variables are E1 (A), E1 (B), P2 (C), P2 (D):
E1 (A) = P2 (C) − P2 (D)
E1 (B) = 2P2 (D)
1 = P2 (C) + P2 (D).

In Example 3.6.2, even after setting E1 (A) = E1 (B) so that there were
only 2 variables, the algebra began to get cumbersome. What if we wanted to
solve a much larger game, such as a 5 X 5 game?
We’ve used matrices to represent our games, but now we want to use them
as a mathematical tool to help us solve systems of equations. In order to use
matrices to solve our systems of equations, we want to write all our equations
in the same form: we will have all the variable terms on the left of the equals
sign and all constants on the right.
Thus, in Example 3.6.1 we can write the system as
3
1
x−y =
5
5
x + y = 3.
In fact, we can simplify the first equation by multiplying both sides by 5:
3x − 5y = 1
x + y = 3.
We can use the coefficients and constants to create a matrix:


3 −5 1
.
1 1 3
In this matrix you have a column for the coefficients of each variable. So the
coefficients of x are in the first column, the coefficients of y are in the second.
The constant terms are always in the last column. Each row corresponds to
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one equation. This matrix is called an augmented matrix. It is really just a
matrix, but we call it augmented if we include information from both sides of
the equation (the coefficients and the constants).
The algebraic method for solving the system of equations (finding the x
and y values that satisfy both equations) is called row reduction. It is based
on the elimination method that you may have seen in a precalculus or college
algebra course. We won’t go through the algebra here, as we really don’t need
it. Since our goal is to be able to easily solve larger systems of equations, we
will rely on technology to do the algebra.
Computer algebra systems such as Sage, Mathematica, and Maple, as well
as graphing calculators, can easily do the row reduction for us.
On a graphing calculator, use the matrix function to enter the matrix.
Then use the “rref” function (this stands for “reduced row echelon form”).
The result will be the following matrix:


1 0 2
.
0 1 1
We can solve this even more directly using Sage.
A= matrix ([[3 , -5 ,1] ,[1 ,1 ,3]]) ;
show (A. rref () )
matrix ([[1 , 0, 2] ,[0 ,1 ,1]])

Recall that the first column is for x and the second is for y. Each row
represents an equation. So translating each row back to equations, we have
the following system of equations:
x + 0y = 2
0x + y = 1
or
x=2
y = 1.
By plugging these values back into the original equations, you can verify
that this is in fact the solution.
Since the technology does all the algebra for us, our job is to translate the
equations into an appropriate matrix and then translate the final matrix back
into the solution to the system of equations. Remember, when using a matrix
to solve a game, the matrix is only a tool, it is not the solution to the game.
Now, let’s try the equations for the expected value method using Example 3.6.2. As presented, how many variables does the system have?
E1 (A) = P2 (C) − P2 (D)
E1 (B) = 2P2 (D)
1 = P2 (C) + P2 (D)
It has 4: E1 (A), E1 (B), P2 (C) and P2 (D). But when we solved these equations, we set the expected values equal. This gives us the two equations
P2 (C) − P2 (D) = 2P2 (D)
1 = P2 (C) + P2 (D).
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Now if we put these into the form with all variables on the left and constants
on the right, we get
P2 (C) − 3P2 (D) = 0
P2 (C) + P2 (D) = 1.
Putting these equations into an augmented matrix, gives us


1 −3 0
,
1 1 1
where the first column corresponds to P2 (C) and the second column corresponds to P2 (D).
A= matrix ([[1 , -3 ,0] ,[1 ,1 ,1]]) ;
show (A. rref () )
matrix ([[1 , 0, 3/4] ,[0 ,1 ,1/4]])

Using row reduction, we get

1
0

0
1


3/4
.
1/4

Thus, recalling Column 1 is for P2 (C) and Column 2 is for P2 (D), our
solution is P2 (C) = 3/4, and P2 (D) = 1/4.
Here are some more systems of equations to practice solving using augmented matrices. If you want to use the above Sage cells just edit the values
for each row in the cell.
Exercise 3.6.3
equations.

Solve a system of 2 equations.
2x − 2y
x + 3y

Solve the system of

=6
=7

Exercise 3.6.4 Solve another system of 2 equations. Solve the system
of equations.
4p1 − 2p2
p1 + p2

=0
=1

For larger matrices, you can edit the Sage cell by adding additional terms in
each row, and adding more rows. For example, you can replace [3, −5, 1], [1, 1, 3]
with [4, 8, −4, 4], [3, 8, 5, −11], [−2, 1, 12, −17].
Exercise 3.6.5 Solve a system of 3 equations. Consider the system of
equations
4x + 8y − 4z
3x + 8y + 5z
−2x + y + 12z

=4
= −11
= −17.

a Set up the augmented matrix for this system.
b Use row reduction to find the solution.
Exercise 3.6.6 Solve another system of 3 equations. Consider the
system of equations
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= 10
= −5
= 7.

a Set up the augmented matrix for this system.
b Use row reduction to find the solution.
Exercise 3.6.7 Even more practice with 3 equations. Consider the
system of equations
a + b − 5c
=0
−4a − b + 6c = 0
a+b+c
= 1.
a Set up the augmented matrix for this system.
b Use row reduction to find the solution.
Exercise 3.6.8 Now, a sytem with 5 equations. Consider the system of
equations
3x + 2y − w − v
2x − y + 3z + w + 5v
x + 2y + 6z − w
−y + z − 3w + v
x+y+z+w+v

=0
=0
=0
=0
= 1.

a Set up the augmented matrix for this system.
b Use row reduction to find the solution.
Now we are ready to apply everything we have learned about solving repeated zero-sum games to a much more challenging game in the next section!

3.7 Undercut
This section requires you to be able to solve “large” systems of equations. You
will be using the matrix techniques from Section 3.6. You are encouraged to
use technology such as a graphing calculator or Sage.
As we saw in Section 3.5, an important part of game theory is the process
of translating a game to a form that we can analyze.
Example 3.7.1 Undercut. Each player chooses a number 1-5. If the two
numbers don’t differ by 1, then each player adds their own number to their
score. If the two numbers differ by 1, then the player with the lower number
adds both numbers to his or her score; the player with the higher number gets
nothing. (From Douglas Hofstadter’s Metamagical Themas.)
For example, suppose in round one Player 1 chooses 4; Player 2 chooses 4.
Each player keeps their own number. The score is now 4-4. In the next round,
Player 1 chooses 2, Player 2 chooses 5. The score would now be 6-9. In the
third round Player 1 chooses 4, Player 2 chooses 5. Now Player 1 gets both
numbers, making the score 15-9.

Exercise 3.7.2 Play Undercut. Choose an opponent and play Undercut
several times. Keep track of the outcomes.
After playing Undercut with an opponent, try to devise a good strategy.
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Exercise 3.7.3 Conjecture a strategy. Just from playing Undercut several
times, can you suggest a strategy for Player 1? What about for Player 2? For
example, what number(s) should you play most often/ least often, or does it
matter? Are there numbers you should never play? Does this game seem fair,
or does one of the players seem to have an advantage? Explain your answers.
As we’ve seen before, a payoff matrix can help with analyzing a game.
Exercise 3.7.4 Payoff matrix. Create a payoff matrix for Undercut. Note
that your payoffs should have a score for each player.
Exercise 3.7.5 Zero-sum. Is this a zero-sum game? Explain.
Exercise 3.7.6 Pure strategy equilibrium. Does there appear to be a
pure strategy equilibrium for this game? Explain.
Let’s assume we are going to play Undercut repeatedly. By the time you
and your opponent are done playing, what should it mean to win the game?
Exercise 3.7.7 Long-run winner. How might we determine a “winner” for
Undercut after playing several times?
Most likely, you said that someone will win the game if they have the most
points. In fact, we probably don’t care if the final score is 10-12 or 110-112. In
either case, Player 2 wins. Since we will play this game several times, we do
care about the point difference. For example, a score of 5-1 would be better
for Player 1 than 5-3. So let’s think about the game in terms of the point
difference between the players in a given game. This is called the net gain. For
example, with score of 5-1, Player 1 would have a net gain of 4.
Exercise 3.7.8 Net gain. Calculate the net gain for Player 1 for each of the
three rounds in Example 3.7.1 in the beginning of this section.
Exercise 3.7.9 Net gain payoff matrix. Create a new payoff matrix for
Undercut which uses the players’ net gain for the payoff vectors.
Exercise 3.7.10 Zero-sum. Is this now a zero-sum game? Explain.
The method of using net gain to describe the payoffs to each player should
be familiar from some of the really early examples where we turned constantsum payoff vectors into zero-sum vectors. But note that the original form of
this game wasn’t even a constant-sum game! What we are really doing here
is thinking about our payoffs not as points, but a win or loss relative to our
opponent. Now that we have reframed Undercut as a zero-sum game, we can
apply our methods for solving the game that we have seen in this chapter.
Exercise 3.7.11 Pure strategy equilibrium. Is there a pure strategy
equilibrium for this game? Explain.
Hint. Rather than looking at each option, you could compare the values for
the pure maximin/ minimax strategies.
This game has one additional property that will help simplify our analysis.
This game is symmetric, meaning the game looks the same to Players 1 and 2.
Exercise 3.7.12 Symmetric games. Give an example of another game
which is symmetric. Give an example of a game which is not symmetric.
Exercise 3.7.13 Expected payoff for a symmetric game. What is the
expected payoff for a symmetric game? Explain your answer.
Hint. You might think about whether it is possible for a player to have an
advantage in a symmetric game.
Hopefully, you determined that there is not a pure strategy equilibrium for
Undercut. Thus, we would like to find a mixed strategy equilibrium. Since
this is a 5 × 5 game, we cannot use our graphical solution. We will need to
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rely on our expected value solution. We want to decide with what probability
we should play each number. Let a, b, c, d, e be the probabilities with which
Player 2 plays 1-5, respectively. For example, if Player 1 plays a pure strategy
of 2, then the expected value for Player 1, E1 (2), is −3a + 0b + 5c − 2d − 3e.
Exercise 3.7.14 Equations for Player 1’s expected value. Write down
the five equations that give Player 1’s expected value for each of Player 1’s
pure strategies.
Exercise 3.7.15 Expected value of a symmetric game. In Exercise 3.7.13, you should have determined that since this is a symmetric game,
the expected value for each Player should be 0. Modify your equations to
include this piece of information. It is important to recognize that this step
greatly simplifies our work for the expected value method since we don’t need
to set the expected values equal to each other. HOWEVER, we can ONLY do
this since we know the game is symmetric!
If we use that the game is symmetric, and hence the expected value of the
game for each player must be 0 since neither player can have an advantage over
the other, we do not need to set the equations equal to each other. We could
not use this method earlier since we had no way of knowing the expected value
of a general game.
We now have five equations and five unknowns. There is a sixth equation:
we know that the probabilities must add up to 1. We can now solve for the
equilibrium strategy!
Exercise 3.7.16 Solve the system of equations. Use matrices to solve
the resulting system of six equations. Give the mixed strategy equilibrium for
Player 2. What is the mixed strategy for Player 1?
Hint.

Should it be different than the strategy for Player 2?

Exercise 3.7.17 Summary. Based on your answer to Exercise 3.7.16, which
number(s) should you play the most often? Which should you play the least?
Are there any numbers that you should never play? Compare the mathematical
solution to your conjectured solution for Exercise 3.7.3. Is there an advantage
to knowing the mathematical solution?
You have now solved a rather complex two-person game. Try playing it
with your friends and family. It may be difficult (or even impossible) to play
randomly with the exact probabilties. It is also unlikely that your opponent
will also be playing the equilibrium strategy, but can you use the solution to
assure an advantage, or at least assure that your opponent doensn’t have an
advantage? Can you see the difference between an exact theoretical solution
to a game, and a practical strategy for playing the game? In the next chapter
we will see even more differences between theoretical and practical solutions
to a game.

Chapter 4

Non-Zero-Sum Games

In the previous chapters we concentrated on zero-sum games. We know
how to solve any zero-sum game. If it has a pure strategy equilibrium, then
we know the players should play the equilibrium strategies. If it doesn’t have
an equilibrium point, then we have seen methods for finding a mixed strategy
equilibrium. Assuming both players are our model rational players, then we
know they should always play an equilibrium strategy.
In this chapter we turn our attention to non-zero-sum games.

4.1 Introduction to Two-Player Non-Zero-Sum
Games
In this section we introduce non-zero-sum games. In a non-zero-sum game the
players’ payoffs no longer need to sum to a constant value. Now it is possible
for both players to gain or both players to lose.
Exercise 4.1.1 Compare properties. What are some properties of a zerosum game that may no longer hold for a non-zero-sum game? For example,
in a zero-sum game is it ever advantageous to inform your opponent of your
strategy? Is it advantageous to communicate prior to game play and determine
a joint plan of action? Would you still want to minimize your opponents payoff?
Let’s build an understanding of non-zero-sum games by looking at an example.
Example 4.1.2 Battle of the Sexes. Alice and Bob want to go out to a
movie. Bob wants to see an action movie, Alice wants to see a comedy. Both
prefer to go to a movie together rather than to go alone. We can represent the
situation with the payoff matrix in Table 4.1.3:
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Table 4.1.3 Battle of the Sexes

Bob

Action
Comedy

Alice
Action
Comedy
(2, 1)
(−1, −1)
(−1, −1)
(1, 2)


Exercise 4.1.4 Not zero-sum. Explain why this is not a zero-sum game.
In zero-sum games it is never advantageous to let your opponent know you
strategy. Does that property still apply for games like Battle of the Sexes?
Exercise 4.1.5 Announcing a strategy. Could it be advantageous for a
player to announce his or her strategy? Could it be harmful to announce his or
her strategy? If possible, describe a scenario in which it would be advantageous
to announce a strategy. If possible, describe a scenario in which it would be
harmful to announce a strategy.
We might first try to analyze Battle of the Sexes using the same techniques
as we used for zero-sum games. For example, we might start as we would in
zero-sum games by looking for any equilibrium points.
Exercise 4.1.6 Equilibrium points. Since our main goal in analyzing
games has been to find equilibrium points, let’s find any equilibrium points for
Battle of teh Sexes. Are there any strategy pairs where players would not want
to switch?
Hint.

There are two!

Exercise 4.1.7 Values of equilibrium points. Are the equilibrium points
the same (in other words, does each player get the same payoff at each equilibrium point)? Compare this to what must happen for zero-sum games.
Now that we know Battle of the Sexes has two equilibrium points, we should
try to find actual strategies for Alice and Bob. Is there a good strategy for
each if they play the game only once? What if they repeat the game? Recall
that with zero-sum games, if there was an equilibrium, rational players always
want to play it, even if the game is repeated. Does that still seem to work
here? Also, how might the ability to communicate change what the players
do?
Exercise 4.1.8 Repeating the game. Suppose the game is played repeatedly. For example, Alice and Bob have movie night once a month. Suggest a
strategy for Alice and for Bob. Feel free to play the game with someone from
class. Try a playing several times without communicating about your strategy
before each game.
Exercise 4.1.9 Communication. How could communication affect the
choice of strategy? Now play several times where you are allowed to communicate about your strategy. Does this change your strategy?
Exercise 4.1.10 Mixed strategy equilibrium. In either case, communicating and not communicating, do you think your strategies for Alice and Bob
represent a mixed strategy equilibrium?
Exercise 4.1.11 Compare to zero-sum. In a zero-sum game, if there is
a pure strategy equilibrium, then what happens when you repeat a game? If
you repeat Battle of the Sexes, does the game always result in an equilibrium
pair?
Hopefully, you are beginning to see some of the challenges for analyzing nonzero-sum games. We know there are equilibrium points in Battle of the Sexes,
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but even rational play may not result in an equilibrium. For the remainder of
this section, let’s assume that players are not allowed to communicate about
strategy prior to play. Such games are called non-cooperative games. Before
moving on, let’s try to find the maximin strategies for our players using the
graphical method, as we did with zero-sum games.
Exercise 4.1.12 Bob’s payoff matrix. Consider Battle of the Sexes from
Bob’s point of view. We know that Bob wants to maximize his payoff (that
has not changed). So Bob doesn’t care what Alice’s payoff’s are. Write down
Bob’s payoff matrix.
Exercise 4.1.13 Graphical method on Bob’s matrix. Recall that the
graphical method represents Bob’s expected payoff depending on how often
he plays each of his options. Sketch the graph associated with Bob’s payoff
matrix.
Exercise 4.1.14 Bob’s maximin mixed strategy. The area between the
two lines still represents the possible expected values for Bob, depending on
how often Alice plays each of her strategies. So as before, the bottom lines
represent the least Bob can expect as he varies his strategy. Thus, the point
of intersection will represent the biggest of these smallest values (the maximin
strategy). Find this point of intersection. How often should Bob play each
option? What is his expected payoff?
So no matter what Alice does, Bob can expect that over the long run he
wins at least the value you found in Exercise 4.1.14. Make sure you understand
this before moving on.
Exercise 4.1.15 Alice’s maximin mixed strategy. Now consider Battle
of the Sexes from Alice’s point of view. Write down her payoff matrix and use
the graphical method to find the probability with which she should play each
option and her expected payoff.
Now, from Exercise 4.1.14 and Exercise 4.1.15 you have the minimum payoff
each player should expect. Note that since this is not a zero-sum game, both
players can expect a positive payoff. But now we want to see how this pair of
mixed strategies really works for the players.
Exercise 4.1.16 Alice’s expected value when Bob plays his maximin
strategy. Assume Bob plays the mixed strategy from Exercise 4.1.14. Calculate Alice’s expected value for each of her pure strategies (E2 (Comedy) and
E2 (Action)).
Exercise 4.1.17 Alice’s preference. Are Alice’s expected values equal? If
not, which strategy does she prefer when Bob plays the mixed strategy from
Exercise 4.1.14? Does Alice want to deviate from her mixed strategy?
Exercise 4.1.18 Mixed strategy equilibrium. Now if Alice plays a pure
strategy, does Bob want to change his strategy? So is the mixed strategy pair
for Bob and Alice from Exercise 4.1.14 and Exercise 4.1.15 an equilibrium? In
fact, if Bob changes his strategy, how does his expected value compare to the
expected value for his mixed strategy?
Exercise 4.1.19 Downside of the graphical method. What goes wrong
with the graphical method in the case of a non-zero-sum game?
Hint. Is it important for Alice to consider the minimax strategy? Does Alice
have any reason to minimize Bob’s payoff?
As we can see by the above example, the methods used to analyze zero-sum
games may not be too helpful for non-zero-sum games. Part of the problem
is that in solving zero-sum games we take into consideration that one player
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wants to minimize the payoff to the other player. This is no longer the case.
Changing strategies may allow BOTH players to do better. A player no longer
has any reason to prevent the other player from doing better.
Exercise 4.1.20 Response to the mixed strategy. So we know the mixed
strategy won’t give us an equilibrium. But suppose we start there. In other
words, suppose Bob plans to play the mixed strategy from Exercise 4.1.14.
Which pure strategy should Alice play? In response, which pure strategy
should Bob play? What is the outcome? Do you end up at an equilibrium?
Exercise 4.1.21 Bos’s expected value when Alice plays her maximin strategy. Now suppose Alice plans to play the mixed strategy from
Exercise 4.1.15. Calculate the expected value for Bob for each of his pure
strategies. Which pure strategy does Bob prefer to play? How will Alice respond to Bob’s pure strategy? What is the outcome? Do you end up at an
equilibrium?
Exercise 4.1.22 Out-guessing the mixed strategy. Suppose Bob thinks
Alice will try the mixed strategy and Alice thinks Bob will try the mixed
strategy. Which pure strategy will each play? What is the outcome? Do you
end up at an equilibrium?
Exercise 4.1.23 Playing the maximin mixed strategy. Considering
Exercise 4.1.20, Exercise 4.1.21, and Exercise 4.1.22, is it in a player’s best
interest to even consider playing the mixed strategy from Exercise 4.1.14 or
Exercise 4.1.15?
We’ve seen the limitations of the graphical method, but what about the
expected value method?
Exercise 4.1.24 Expected value solution. Try applying the expected
value method to Battle of the Sexes. What mixed strategies do you get?
Explain why this method will also not result in an equilibrium. You might want
to consider whether it is important for one player to minimize the expected
value for the other player.
Now that we have seen how the methods that allowed us to solve zero-sum
games don’t work for non-zero-sum games, we will need to find new ways to
approach non-zero-sum games.

4.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken
Before getting any further into non-zero-sum games, let’s recall some key ideas
about zero-sum games.
• If a zero-sum game has an equilibrium point, then repeating the game
does not affect how the players will play.
• If a zero-sum game has more that one equilibrium point then the values
of the equilibrium points are the same.
• In a zero-sum game, we can find mixed strategy equilibrium points using
the graphical method or the expected value method.
• In a zero-sum game, a player never benefits from communicating her
strategy to her opponent.
Hopefully, in the last section you saw that non-zero-sum games can differ
on all of the above!

CHAPTER 4. NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES

58

Example 4.2.1 A 2 × 2 Non-Zero Sum Game. Let’s consider the game
given by Table 4.2.2.
Table 4.2.2 A non-zero sum example
A
B

C
(0, 0)
(5, 10)

D
(10, 5)
(0, 0)


Exercise 4.2.3 Not zero-sum. Check that this is NOT a zero-sum game.
Even with non-zero-sum games, it is helpful to start by finding any equilibrium points.
Exercise 4.2.4 Equilibrium points. Using the “guess and check” method
for finding equilibria, you should be able to determine that Table 4.2.2 has two
equilibrium points. What are they?
Exercise 4.2.5 Preference between equilibria. As we saw in Section 4.1,
the equilibrium points in non-zero-sum games need not have the same values.
Does Player 1 prefer one of the equilibria from Exercise 4.2.4 over the other?
Since it is now possible for BOTH players to benefit at the same time, it
might be a good idea for players to communicate with each other. For example,
if Player 1 says that she will choose A no matter what, then it is in Player 2’s
best interest to choose D. If communication is allowed in the game, then we
say the non-zero-sum game is cooperative. If no communication is allowed, we
say it is non-cooperative.
We saw in Section 4.1, that our methods for analyzing zero-sum games do
not work very well on non-zero-sum games. Let’s look a little closer at this.
If we apply the graphical method for Player 1 to the above game, we get
that Player 1 should play a (1/3, 2/3) mixed strategy for an expected payoff of
10/3. Similarly we can determine that Player 2 should play a (2/3, 1/3) mixed
strategy for an expected payoff of 10/3. Recall we developed this strategy as a
“super defensive” strategy. But are our players motivated to play as defensively
in a non-zero-sum game? Not necessarily! It is no longer true that Player 2
needs to keep Player 1 from gaining!
Now suppose, Player 1 plays the (1/3, 2/3) strategy. Then the expected
payoff to Player 2 for playing pure strategy C, E2 (C), is 20/3; and the expected
payoff to Player 2 for playing pure strategy D, E2 (D), is 5/3. Thus Player 2
prefers C over D. But if Player 2 plays only C, then Player 1 should abandon
her (1/3, 2/3) strategy and just play B! This results in the payoff vector (5,
10). Notice, that now the expected value for Player 1 is 5, which is better than
10/3! Again, since Player 2 is not trying to keep Player 1 from gaining, there
is no reason to apply the maximin strategy to non-zero-sum games. Similarly,
we don’t want to apply the expected value solution since Player 1 does not
care if Player 2’s expected values are equal. Each player only cares about his
or her own payoff, not the payoff of the other player.
OK, so now, how do we analyze these games?
Exercise 4.2.6 Conjecture a strategy. What are some possible strategies
for each player? Might some strategies depend on what a player knows about
her opponent?
Can you see that some of the analysis might be better understood with
psychology than with mathematics?
In order to better understand non-zero-sum games we look at two classic
games.
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Example 4.2.7 Prisoner’s Dilemma. Two partners in crime are arrested
for burglary and sent to separate rooms. They are each offered a deal: if they
confess and rat on their partner, they will receive a reduced sentence. So if one
confesses and the other doesn’t, the confessor only gets 3 months in prison,
while the partner serves 10 years. If both confess, then they each get 8 years.
However, if neither confess, there isn’t enough evidence, and each gets just one
year. We can represent the situation with the matrix in Table 4.2.8.
Table 4.2.8 The Prisoner’s Dilemma (years in prison).

Prisoner 1

Confess
Don’t Confess

Prisoner 2
Confess
Don’t Confess
(8, 8)
(0.25, 10)
(10, 0.25)
(1, 1)


Since this game, as presented, is probably only playerd once, we can begin
by looking for dominated strategies and equilibrium points.
Exercise 4.2.9 Dominated strategies. Does the matrix in Table 4.2.8 have
any dominated strategies for Player 1? Does it have any dominated strategies
for Player 2? Keep in mind that a prisoner prefers smaller numbers since prison
time is bad.
If you were to be one of the prisoners, what would you do? Do you think
everyone would do that, too? What would our perfectly rational player do?
Would your strategy change if you are allowed to communicate? We examine
some of these questions in the next few exercises.
Exercise 4.2.10 A prisoner’s strategy. Suppose you are Prisoner 1. What
should you do? Why? Suppose you are Prisoner 2. What should you do? Why?
Does your choice of strategies result in an equilibrium pair?
Exercise 4.2.11 The best outcome. Looking at the game as an outsider,
what strategy pair is the best option for both prisoners.
Exercise 4.2.12 Two rational prisoners. Now suppose both prisoners are
perfectly rational, so that any decision Prisoner 1 makes would also be the
decision Prisoner 2 makes. Further, suppose both prisoners know that their
opponent is perfectly rational. What should each prisoner do?
Exercise 4.2.13 A crazy prisoner. Suppose Prisoner 2 is crazy and is likely
to confess with 50/50 chance. What should Prisoner 1 do? Does it change if
he confesses with a 75% chance? What if he confesses with a 25% chance.
Exercise 4.2.14 Communication between prisoners. Suppose the prisoners are able to communicate about their strategy. How might this affect
what they choose to do?
Exercise 4.2.15 The dilemma. Explain why this is a “dilemma” for the
prisoners. Is it likely they will chose a strategy which leads to the best outcome
for both? You might want to consider whether there are dominated strategies.
You should now have some idea about why we call this game a dilemma,
since the players may in fact have difficulty deciding on whether to confess or
not. Even two perfectly rational players may not be able to get the best payoff.
We now turn to another classic example. We can ask similar qustions about
Chicken that we ask about Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Example 4.2.16 Chicken. Two drivers drive towards each other. If one
driver swerves, he is considered a “chicken.” If a driver doesn’t swerve (drives
straight), he is considered the winner. Of course if neither swerves, they crash
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and neither wins. A possible payoff matrix for this game is given in Table 4.2.17.
Table 4.2.17 The game of Chicken.

Driver 1

Swerve
Straight

Driver 2
Swerve
Straight
(0, 0)
(−1, 10)
(10, −1) (−100, −100)


Again, since this game as presented is probably only playerd once, we can
begin by looking for dominated strategies and equilibrium points.
Exercise 4.2.18 Dominated strategies. Does the Chicken game in Table 4.2.17 have any dominated strategies?
Exercise 4.2.19 The best outcome. What strategy results in the best
outcome for Driver 1? What strategy results in the best outcome for Driver 2?
What happens if they both choose that strategy?
Exercise 4.2.20 Equilibrium points. Consider the strategy pair with
outcome (−1, 10). Does Driver 1 have any regrets about his choice? What
about Driver 2? Is this an equilibrium point? Are there any other points in
which neither driver would regret his or her choice?
If you were to be one of the drivers, what would you do? Do you think
everyone would do that, too? What would our perfectly rational player do?
Would your strategy change if you are allowed to communicate? We examine
some of these questions in the next few exercises.
Exercise 4.2.21 A driver’s strategy. Can you determine what each driver
should do in Chicken? If so, does this result in an equilibrium pair?
Exercise 4.2.22 Two rational drivers. Now suppose both drivers in the
game of Chicken are perfectly rational, so that any decision Driver 1 makes
would also be the decision Driver 2 makes. Further, suppose both drivers know
that their opponent is perfectly rational. What should each driver do?
Exercise 4.2.23 A remote control driver. Suppose Driver 2 is a remote
control dummy and will swerve or drive straight with a 50/50 chance. What
should Driver 1 do? Does it change if the remote contro dummy swerves with
75% chance?
Exercise 4.2.24 Communication between drivers. Can it benefit drivers
in the game of Chicken to communicate about their strategy? Explain.
Exercise 4.2.25 Compare games. Compare Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Chicken. Are there dominated strategies in both games? Are there equilibrium pairs? Are players likely to reach the optimal payoff for one player, both
players, or neither player? Does a player’s choice depend on what he knows
about his opponent (perfectly rational or perfectly random)?
Both Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken are models of games where we describe the choice of strategy as “Cooperate” and “Defect”. In Prisoner’s Dilemma,
we think of “cooperating” as cooperating with the other player, and “defecting”
as turning against the other player. So if both players cooperate (with each
other, not the police), they will get the higher payoff of only one year in prison.
They defect by ratting on each other. In Chicken, players cooperate by swerving and defect by driving straight. Using the examples of Prisoner’s Dilemma
and Chicken, think about how these games can model other everyday interactions where you could describe your choices as cooperating and defecting. The
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remainder of the chapter looks more closely at situations where players can
cooperate or defect.

4.3 A Class-Wide Experiment
We are going to look at a class-wide game.
Each member of the class secretly chooses a single letter: “C” or “D,”
standing for “cooperate” or “defect.” This will be used as your strategy choice
in the following game with each of the other players in the class. Here is how
it works for each pair of players: if they both cooperate, they get each get 3
points. If they both defect, they each get 1 point. If one cooperates and one
defects, the cooperator gets nothing, but the defector gets 5 points. Your one
choice of “C” or “D” will be used to play the game with all the other players
in the class.
Thus, if everyone chooses “C,” everyone will get 3 points per person (not
counting yourself). If everyone chooses “D,” everyone will get 1 point per
person (not counting yourself). You can’t lose! And of course, anyone chooses
“D” will get at least as much as everyone else will. If, for example in a class
of 20 poeple, 11 people choose “C” and 9 choose “D,” then the 11 C-ers will
get 3 points apiece from the other C-ers (making 30 points), and zero from
the D-ers. So C-ers will get 30 points each. The D-ers, by contrast, will pick
up 5 points apiece from each of the C-ers, making 55 points, and 1 point from
each of the other D-ers, making 8 points, for a grand total of 63 points. No
matter what the distribution is, D-ers always do better than C-ers. Of course,
the more C-ers there are, the better everyone will do!
By the way, I should make it clear that in making your choice, you should
not aim to be the winner, but simply to get as many points for yourself as
possible. Thus you should be happier to get 30 points (as a result of saying
“C” along with 10 others, even though the 9 D-sayers get more than you) than
to get 19 points (by saying “D” along with everybody else, so nobody “beats”
you).
Of course, your hope is to be the only defector, thus really cleaning up:
with 19 C-ers, you’ll get 95 points, and they’ll each get 18 times 3, namely
54 points! But why am I doing the multiplication or any of this figuring for
you? You’ve been studying game theory. So have all of you! You are all
equally versed in game theory and understand about making rational choices.
Therefore, I hardly need to tell you that you are to make what you consider
to be your maximally rational choice. In particular, feelings of morality, guilt,
apathy, and so on, are to be disregarded. Reasoning alone (of course including
reasoning about others’ reasoning) should be the basis of your decision.
So all you need to do is make your choice. Write it down.
It is to be understood (it almost goes without saying, but not quite) that
you are not to discuss your answer with anyone else from the class. The purpose
is to see what people do on their own, in isolation. Along with your answer you
should include a short explanation for why you made your particular choice.
Adapted from Douglas Hofstadter, Metamagical Themas, p. 740.
–––––––––––––––––––––
Once everyone in class has made his or her choice, share your answers with
the class. Then answer the following questions about the class’s responses.
Exercise 4.3.1 Summary of responses.
a How many C’s were there?
b How many D’s were there?
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c What was the payoff to each C?
d What was the payoff to each D?
Exercise 4.3.2 Payoff matrix. Determine the payoff matrix for class-wide
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Hint. Although you played this game with each other person in the class,
this is still a 2 person game!
Exercise 4.3.3 Reasons for choice. What are some reasons people chose
C? What are some reasons people chose D?
Although we can now see what everyone chose, we might not agree that
everyone made the most rational choice. How might perfectly rational players
play the game?
Exercise 4.3.4 The rational choice. Thinking about the idea of rationality,
what appears to be the most rational choice, C or D? If everyone is equally
rational, then what would everyone do? If everyone is equally rational, should
everyone choose the same thing?
Exercise 4.3.5 Everyone is rational. Now suppose everyone is equally
(and perfectly) rational. AND everyone knows that everyone else is equally
(and perfectly) rational. What should everyone choose?
Hint. If everyone knows that everyone will choose the same answer, what
should everyone choose to do?
The next two exercises look at two more examples of games where players can “Cooperate” or “Defect”. How does changing the payoffs change the
players’ incentive to cooperate or defect?
Exercise 4.3.6 A game of cooperation and defection. Consider the
game in Table 4.3.7
Table 4.3.7 Matrix for Exercise 4.3.6
C
D

C
(3, 3)
(50, 0)

D
(0, 50)
(.01, .01)

What would you do? Why? What seems to be the most rational thing to
do? Why?
Exercise 4.3.8 Another game of cooperation and defection. Consider
the game in Table 4.3.9
Table 4.3.9 Matrix for Exercise 4.3.8
C
D

C
(1000, 1000)
(100, 0)

D
(0, 100)
(100, 100)

What would you do? Why? What seems to be the most rational thing to
do? Why?
Exercise 4.3.10 Motivation to cooperate or defect. Looking at all three
of the above games, can you think of what sort of payoffs you would need in
order to cooperate (C)? What about to defect (D)?
Not every game where player’s cooperate or defect is a Prisoner’s Dilemma,
or even a dilemma. You can certainly change the payoffs in the above matrices
so that it is very clear what each player should do. But as you’ve seen with this
section’s experiment, there is something special about the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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Everyone does better if they all cooperate, but any one player does better to
defect. The next section will look more specifically at what makes a game a
Prisoner’s Dilemma.

4.4 What Makes a Prisoner’s Dilemma?
In this section we give a mathematical description of Prisoner’s Dilemma and
compare it to some similar games.
The Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma game we played in Section 4.3 has the
payoff matrix given in Table 4.4.1 for each pair of players.
Table 4.4.1 A Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Player 1

Cooperate
Defect

Player
Cooperate
(3, 3)
(5, 0)

2
Defect
(0, 5)
(1, 1)

We can classify each of the values for the payoffs as follows:
• Reward for Mutual Cooperation: R = 3.
• Punishment for Defecting: P = 1.
• Temptation to Defect: T = 5.
• Sucker’s Payoff: S = 0.
In order for a game to be a variation of Prisoner’s Dilemma it must satisfy
two conditions:
1. T > R > P > S
2. (T + S)/2 < R
Let’s apply this description of Prisoner’s Dilemma to a few games we’ve
seen. We can use the conditions to check if a game is really a Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
Exercise 4.4.2 Description of conditions. Describe each of the conditions
(A) and (B) in words.
Hint. (T + S)/2 is the average of T and S.
Exercise 4.4.3 The conditions for Classwide Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Show that the two conditions hold for the Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Exercise 4.4.4 The conditions for Prisoner’s Dilemma. Recall the
matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma from Example 4.2.7.
Table 4.4.5 Prisoner’s Dilemma (again).

Prisoner 1

Confess
Don’t Confess

Prisoner 2
Confess
Don’t Confess
(8, 8)
(0.25, 10)
(10, 0.25)
(1, 1)

Determine R, P, T, and S for this game. Be careful: think about what
cooperating versus defecting should mean. Show the conditions for Prisoner’s
Dilemma are satisfied.
Hint. Time in jail is bad, so the bigger the number, the worse you do; thus,
it might be helpful to think of the payoffs as negatives.
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Exercise 4.4.6 The conditions for Chicken. Recall the matrix for Chicken
from Example 4.2.16.
Table 4.4.7 Chicken (again).

Driver 1

Swerve
Straight

Driver 2
Swerve
Straight
(0, 0)
(−1, 10)
(10, −1) (−100, −100)

Determine R, P, T, and S for this game. Again, think about what cooperating and defecting mean in this game. Determine if the conditions for Prisoner’s
Dilemma are satisfied. If not, which condition(s) fail?
Exercise 4.4.8 The conditions on another game. Consider the game:

C
D

C
D
(3, 3)
(0, 50)
(50, 0) (.01, .01)

Determine R, P, T, and S for this game. Determine if the conditions for
Prisoner’s Dilemma are satisfied. If not, which condition(s) fail?
Exercise 4.4.9 A little more practice. Consider the game:

C
D

C
D
(1000, 1000) (0, 100)
(100, 0)
(100, 100)

Determine R, P, T, and S for this game. Determine if the conditions for
Prisoner’s Dilemma are satisfied. If not, which condition(s) fail?
Exercise 4.4.10 Compare the games. The games in Exercise 4.4.6, Exercise 4.4.8, and Exercise 4.4.9 are not true Prisoner’s Dilemmas. For each game,
how do the changes in payoffs affect how you play? In particular, in Prisoner’s
Dilemma, a player will generally choose to defect. This results in a non-optimal
payoff for each player. Is this still true in Exercise 4.4.6, Exercise 4.4.8, and
Exercise 4.4.9? If possible, use the changes in the conditions (A) and (B) to
help explain any differences in how one should play.
We can now define defection as the idea that if everyone did it, things would
be worse for everyone. Yet, if only one (or a small) number did it, life would be
sweeter for that individual. We can define cooperation as the act of resisting
temptation for the betterment of all players.
Exercise 4.4.11 Example from real life. Give an example of defection
and cooperation from real life.

4.5 Another Multiplayer Experiment
This activity needs to be played as a class. All players need to be able to
respond without being able to see the responses of others. Answers may be
revealed before moving on to the next question.
Without sharing your answers with others, select your answer to the following questions. Try to be as honest about your answer as possible. Make
sure you have a reason for each answer.
1. The lights go out in the neighborhood. Someone needs to call the power
company. If someone calls, everyone’s lights go on.
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(a) Call
(b) Don’t call
2. The same as in (1), but now you have to wait on hold for 5 minutes.
(a) Call
(b) Don’t call
3. The same as in (1), but now you have to wait on hold for 30 minutes.
(a) Call
(b) Don’t call
4. The same as in (1), but now you have to pay a $.50 service fee.
(a) Call
(b) Don’t call
5. The same as in (1), but now you have to pay a $2.50 service fee.
(a) Call
(b) Don’t call
6. The phone lines go down in your small mountain community. You have
to hike 3 miles in the snow to notify the power company.
(a) Hike to notify the phone company
(b) Stay home and let someone else do the hiking
7. Everyone in your class cheats on an exam. The professor says if someone
confesses they receive an F. If no one confesses, everyone fails.
(a) Confess
(b) Don’t confess
8. Evil Dr. No captures the class and puts you in all in a shark tank
separated so you can’t communicate. If one person volunteers to be
eaten then the rest go free. If no one volunteers after 10 minutes all get
eaten by sharks.
(a) Volunteer
(b) Don’t volunteer
9. Evil Dr. No captures your family and puts you in all in a shark tank
separated so you can’t communicate. If one person volunteers to be eaten
then the rest go free. If no one volunteers after 10 minutes all get eaten
by sharks.
(a) Volunteer
(b) Don’t volunteer
10. For any “Big Brother” fans. Choose to eat all your favorite foods for a
week or nasty “slop” for a week. If at least three people say slop, everyone
gets what they asked for. Otherwise everyone is on slop.
(a) Favorite foods
(b) Slop
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11. OK, now let’s get serious about this. Answer 5 points or 1 point. If at
least one person says 1 point, everyone gets the number of points they
chose. Otherwise, everyone gets 0 points.
(a) 5 points
(b) 1 point
12. Answer 20 points or 1 point. If at least one person says 1 point, everyone
gets the number of points they chose. Otherwise, everyone gets 0 points.
(a) 20 points
(b) 1 point
13. Answer 6 points or 5 points. If at least one person says 5 points, everyone
gets the number of points they chose. Otherwise, everyone gets 0 points.
(a) 6 points
(b) 5 points
14. Answer 20 points or 1 point. If at least five people say 1 point, everyone
gets the number of points they chose. Otherwise, everyone gets 0 points.
(a) 20 points
(b) 1 point
––––––––––––––––––––––––––After answering the above questions and seeing the reponses from your
classmates, think about how you responded. Did this differ from how your
classmates responded? Try to give reasons for how you chose your responses
to the above questions. Ask classmates for their reasons for responding as they
did. It can be particularly useful to share your answers with someone who
chose a different response from you. You can summarize the various reasons
for voluteering and not volunteering in the exercises below.
Exercise 4.5.1 Volunteer or not. After answering the questions, were
you likely to volunteer or unlikely to volunteer? For example, were you likely
to be the one to call the power company or get eaten by sharks, or were you
generally hoping someone else would do it? If it depended on the situation,
explain under what circumstances you were likely to volunteer.
Exercise 4.5.2 Always a volunteer. After sharing your answers as a class,
did each situation have a volunteer? In other words, was there always someone
willing to call the power company or take fewer points? If there was a question
with no volunteer, can you suggest why?
Exercise 4.5.3 Unlikely to volunteer. For which questions was it unlikely
that there would be very many volunteers? Did you take that into consideration
when deciding if you were going to volunteer?
Exercise 4.5.4 Reasons to volunteer. What are some reasons for volunteering? What are some reasons for not to volunteer?

4.6 Volunteer’s Dilemma
In Section 4.5 we played a game called Volunteer’s Dilemma.
Example 4.6.1 A Volunteer’s Dilemma. One example of a Volunteer’s
Dilemma is the game where everyone chooses “1 point” or “5 points.” If at least
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one person writes down 1 point, then everyone gets the number of points they
wrote down. If no one chooses 1 point, then everyone gets 0 points. Choosing
“1 point” is considered volunteering or cooperating. Choosing to not volunteer
and take “5 points” is defecting.
You should note that it is difficult to put this game into a matrix form since
payoffs depend on whether there is at least one volunteer or cooperator.

In this section we will compare Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma with Volunteer’s Dilemma. In particular, we want to think about the effect cooperating
and defecting have on the group of players. How does one player’s choice affect
everyone else? What happens to the group if there is a single cooperator or
a single defector? What happens if everyone cooperates or everyone defects?
We will use the payoffs for Prisoner’s Dilemma from Section 4.3, given again
in Table 4.6.2.
Table 4.6.2 Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma (again).

Driver 1

Cooperate
Defect

Player
Cooperate
(3, 3)
(5, 0)

2
Defect
(0, 5)
(1, 1)

Exercise 4.6.3 Effect of a single defector in Class-wide Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma what effect does one defector
have on the group? In other words, if a single player defects, how many points
does he cost each of the other players?
Exercise 4.6.4 Effect of everyone’s defection in Class-wide Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma what effect does everyone’s
defection have on the group? In other words, what is the most points lost by
the group if everyone defects?
Exercise 4.6.5 Effect of your defection in Class-wide Prisoner’s
Dilemma. In Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma what effect could your own
defection have on the group? In other words, how many points does the group
lose if you defect instead of cooperate? You may need to consider different
cases depending on how many cooperators there are. For example what if
there are no cooperators? What if there are no defectors? What if there are
some of each?
Exercise 4.6.6 Effect of a single defector in Volunteer’s Dilemma. In
Volunteer’s Dilemma, with the payoffs given in Example 4.6.1, what effect does
one defector have on the group? In other words, if there is a single defector,
how many points do each of the other players lose?
Exercise 4.6.7 Effect of everyone’s defection in Volunteer’s Dilemma.
In Volunteer’s Dilemma, with the payoffs given in Example 4.6.1, what effect
does everyone’s defection have on the group? In other words, if everyone defects, how many points does the group lose?
Exercise 4.6.8 Effect of your defection in Volunteer’s Dilemma. In
Volunteer’s Dilemma, with the payoffs given in Example 4.6.1, what effect could
your own defection have on the group? In other words, how many points does
the group lose if you defect instead of cooperate? You may need to consider
different cases depending on how many cooperators there are. For example
what if there are no cooperators? What if there are no defectors? What if
there are some of each?
Now that we’ve considered how an individual decision can affect the group,
we can think about what the most rational strategy is in a multiplayer Pris-
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oner’s Dilemma or a Volunteer’s Dilemma.
Exercise 4.6.9 Rationality in Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma. Considering your answers above and to previous work with Prisoner’s Dilemma, in
Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is more rational to be a cooperator or
a defector? Why?
Exercise 4.6.10 Everyone is rational in Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Whichever strategy you chose in Exercise 4.6.9, explain what would happen if
everyone was the most rational. Is it now more rational to do the opposite?
Exercise 4.6.11 Rationality in Volunteer’s Dilemma. Considering your
answers above, in Volunteer’s Dilemma, which is more rational to be a cooperator (volunteer) or a defector? Why?
Exercise 4.6.12 Everyone is rational in Volunteer’s Dilemma. Whichever
strategy you chose in Exercise 4.6.11, explain what would happen if everyone
was the most rational. Is it now more rational to do the opposite?
Exercise 4.6.13 Class-wide Chicken. Volunteer’s Dilemma can also be
called “Class-wide Chicken.” Try to describe this class-wide game in terms of
“swerving” and “going straight.” How do the payoffs for Volunteer’s Dilemma
relate to the payoffs for Chicken?
Even though the Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Volunteer’s Dilemma
games were played with multiple players, each game was only played once. In
the next section we look at what might happen if we repeatedly play Prisoner’s
Dilemma with the same opponent.

4.7 Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this section we look at two players playing Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly.
We call this game an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Recall the general Prisoner’s
Dilemma matrix from previous sections, given again in Table 4.7.1.
Table 4.7.1 A Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix.

Driver 1

Cooperate
Defect

Player
Cooperate
(3, 3)
(5, 0)

2
Defect
(0, 5)
(1, 1)

Before playing the iterated version, think about how you would play the
above game if you only play it once with an opponent. But let’s also give the
game some context as in the following exercise.
Exercise 4.7.2 A single internet purchase. Suppose the above matrix
represents the situation of purchasing an item (say, a used textbook) on the
internet where both parties are untraceable. You agree to send the money at
the same time that the seller agrees to send the book. Then we can think of
Cooperating as each of you sending money/ book, and Defecting as not sending
money/ book. Why might a player Cooperate? Why might a player Defect?
Exercise 4.7.3 Repeated internet purchases. Now suppose you wish to
continue to do business with the other party. For example, instead of buying a
used textbook, maybe you are buying music downloads. Why might a player
cooperate? Why might a player defect? Do these resons differ from your
reasons in Exercise 4.7.2?
It is possible that your answers to the above questions depended on the
context, so let’s go back to just thinking about the game as a simple matrix

CHAPTER 4. NON-ZERO-SUM GAMES

69

game. Think about how you played the Class-wide Prisoner’s Dilemma, but
now think about repeating the game several times with the same player. Do
you think your strategy would change? Remember, if we repeat the game we
are not restricted to playing a pure strategy.
Exercise 4.7.4 Strategy for repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Suggest a
strategy for playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Table 4.7.1 repeatedly. DON’T
SHARE YOUR STRATEGY WITH ANYONE YET!
Now let’s see how your strategy works by actually playing the game several
times.
Exercise 4.7.5 Play Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly. Play 10 rounds of
Prisoner’s Dilemma with someone in class. Use your suggested strategy. Keep
track of the payoffs. Did your strategy seem effective? What should it mean
to have an “effective” strategy?
We are now going to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament! Several strategies are suggested below. Choose one of the strategies below (or keep playing
with your own strategy). You are to play your strategy against everyone else
in the class. Keep a running total of your score. Don’t tell your opponents
your strategy.
Some possible strategies:
• Strategy: Defection. Your strategy is to always choose DEFECT (D).
• Strategy: Cooperation. Your strategy is to always choose COOPERATE (C).
• Strategy: Tit for Tat. Your strategy is to play whatever your opponent
just played. Your first move is to COOPERATE (C), but then you need
to repeat your opponent’s last move.
• Strategy: Tit for Two Tats. Your strategy is to COOPERATE (C)
unless your opponent DEFECTS twice in a row. After two D’s you
respond with D.
• Strategy: Random (1/2, 1/2). Your strategy is to COOPERATE (C)
randomly 50% of the time and DEFECT (D) 50% of the time. [Note:
it will be hard to be truly random, but try to play each option approximately the same amount.]
• Strategy: Random (3/4, 1/4). Your strategy is to COOPERATE (C)
randomly 75% of the time and DEFECT (D) 25% of the time. [Note: it
will be hard to be truly random, but try to play C more often than D.]
• Strategy: Random (1/4, 3/4). Your strategy is to COOPERATE (C)
randomly 25% of the time and DEFECT (D) 75% of the time. [Note: it
will be hard to be truly random, but try to play D more often than C.]
• Strategy: Tit for Tat with Occasional Surprise D. Your strategy
is to play whatever your opponent just played. Your first move is to
COOPERATE (C), but then you need to repeat your opponent’s last
move. Occasionally, you will deviate from this strategy by playing D.
Exercise 4.7.6 A Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament. WITHOUT SHARING YOUR STRATEGY, play Prisoner’s Dilemma 10 times with each of the
other members of the class. Keep track of the payoffs for each game and your
total score.
After playing Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma as a class, can you determine who
used which strategy? At this point you may share your strategy with others.
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Was your strategy more effective with some strategies than with others? If
some of the above strategies were not used, can you guess how your strategy
would have done against them?
Exercise 4.7.7 Effectiveness of your strategy. Describe which opponents’
strategies seemed to give you more points, which seemed to give you fewer?
Exercise 4.7.8 Winning strategies. Describe the strategy or strategies
that had the highest scores in the tournament. Does this seem surprising?
Why or why not? How do the winning strategies compare to the strategy you
suggested in Exercise 4.7.4?
What strategies seem the most rational? Are pure strategies the most
rational? Does it depend on what sort of strategy your opponent is playing?
Exercise 4.7.9 Rationality in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. How does
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma differ from the “one-time” Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Try to think in terms of rational strategies.
As Exercise 4.7.3 suggests we can think of real-life interactions that can be
modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Exercise 4.7.10 Example of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in real
life. Describe a situation from real life that resembles a Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
Repeated or Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has applications to biology and
sociology. If you think of higher point totals as “success as a species” in biology
or “success of a society” in sociology, we can try to determine which strategies
seem the most effective or successful. Individuals do not need the highest point
total to be successful, but low point totals will not succeed. Just like grades
in a course, you don’t need the highest score to pass a class, but very bad
scores will fail. In order to model the situation of a society, think about what
happens to defectors in a society of cooperators or cooperators in a society of
defectors. Who will be able to succeed?
Exercise 4.7.11 Only a few defectors. How do a few defectors fare in a
society of mostly cooperators? How do the cooperators fare? (In other words,
who will be more successful?) Keep in mind that everyone is playing with
lots of cooperators and only a few defectors. Who will have the most points,
cooperators or defectors?
Exercise 4.7.12 Only a few cooperators. How do a few cooperators fare
in a society of mostly defectors? How do the defectors fare? (In other words,
who will be more successful?) Keep in mind that everyone is playing with
lots of defectors and only a few cooperators. Who will have the most points,
cooperators or defectors?
After thinking about individuals in a society playing pure strategies, what
happens to individiuals who are playing some of the mixed strategies listed
above?
Exercise 4.7.13 A society of TIT-FOR-TATers. Now consider a society
of mostly TIT-FOR-TATers. How do a few defectors fare in a society of mostly
TIT-FOR-TATers? How do the TIT-FOR-TATers fare? How would a few
cooperators fare with the TIT-FOR-TATers? Would the evolution of such a
society favor cooperation or defection?
The TIT-FOR-TAT strategy is particularly interesting in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It has a few special characteristics that lead to success. First
it is responsive in that it responds to the strategy of the other player. If the
other player is cooperating, the TIT-FOR-TAT strategy will be able to gain
the 3 points on each round. If the other player is defecting, it will defect so as
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to not keep getting the sucker’s payoff of 0. The random strategies and pure
strategies, for example, are not responsive. They do not respond to how the
other player is playing. Chances are when you played in the tournament, you
wanted to be able to adapt your strategy to respond to how your opponent
was playing.
The TIT-FOR-TAT strategy is also nice in that it starts by cooperating. If
it meets another cooperator it will continue to cooperate. If the opponent at
some point begins cooperating, it will, too. However, it is also unexploitable.
This means that a defector cannot take advantage of the “niceness.” It “punishes” any defection with an in-kind defection.
The TIT-FOR-TAT behavior has been observed in some animal populations, but you also might be able to think of situations in your own life where
you or your friends have employed such a strategy with each other! Has it been
effective for you?

4.8 Popular Culture: Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Chicken
In this section, we will look at applications of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Chicken
in popular culture.
The movie Return to Paradise (1998) explores a Prisoner’s Dilemma throughout the film. The two main characters, Tony and Sheriff, must decide if they
will cooperate by returning to Malaysia to serve time in prison, or defect by
not returning to Malaysia. If both defect, their friend will die in prison. If
both cooperate, their friend will be released and they will each serve short
sentences.
Question 4.8.1 Give a payoff matrix to model the Prisoner’s Dilemma in the
film. By the end of the film have the payoffs changed? Is it still a Prisoner’s
Dilemma? Explain.

Question 4.8.2 In the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma, communication is not allowed between the players. In the film, Tony and Sheriff can communicate
all they want. How does this communication impact the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Does it help or hinder their choice of strategy? Explain.

The movie Rebel Without a Cause (1955) contains an iconic Chicken scene,
in which the two characters race towards a cliff. The last one to jump out of
his car is declared the winner.
Question 4.8.3 Does Jim win or lose the game of Chicken? Explain your
answer.

Question 4.8.4 The movie Footloose (1984) also has a Chicken scene (this
time with tractors). Compare the Chicken scenes in Rebel and Footloose. Is
the Chicken game used similarly in each? In both scenes, one player has no
choice of strategy. Why might the writer have made this choice in each of these
films?

Now try to apply the ideas of rationality and perfect information to your
own popular culture examples.
Question 4.8.5 Suppose players are allowed to communicate in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Explain the relationship between trust and communication in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Give an example from a film demonstrating the relationship.
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Question 4.8.6 Why might a writer include a Chicken scene in a film? What
key attributes might the director be trying to display about the winner of
Chicken and the loser? Use an example from popular culture to demonstrate
your answer.

Question 4.8.7 One of the interesting comparisons between Prisoner’s Dilemma
ad Chicken is that in a Prisoner’s Dilemma is with their equilibrium points.
Players in a Prisoner’s Dilemma can reach an equilibrium point if they play the
same way. Players in a Chicken game can reach an equilibrium if they choose
different strategies. Find examples of how these games are used in popular
culture to emphasize differences between characters.
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